LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Amy Quark
William & Mary

The past few years have been marked by vigorous debate about the future of our Section. What is remarkable is the deep commitment so many of us have to the Section and to the powerful insights that world-systems analysis offers to an understanding of these tumultuous times. Our new mission statement and bylaws change signal two important directions for the Section’s future.

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First, the mission statement reflects not a “new” direction but rather a re-commitment to the importance of world-systems analysis. Second and related, the bylaws changes represent a renewed effort to make our Section an inclusive space that supports members in their research and teaching, as well as in their efforts to dismantle the barriers limiting the participation of underrepresented students, scholars, activists, teachers, and practitioners in the production of knowledge.

Together, these changes signal our shared commitment to building on our Section’s legacy and fostering the work of scholars in the Global North and the Global South who continue to contribute to this analytical framework.

Our line-up of section panels at ASA in NYC will be a great opportunity to come together around these shared goals. Our Section’s designated conference day is Monday, August 12. We will kick off the day with the session, “The Global South and the Intellectual Lineages of World-Systems Analysis.” This set of papers will reflect on the role of scholars and popular struggles in the Global South in the development of world-systems analysis and the implications for contemporary struggles and theoretical debates. A second session, “South-South Flows in Global Context,” will revisit long-standing debates in PEWS surrounding core-periphery dynamics, colonialism, and imperialism in the context of growing South-South flows of capital, labor, and finance. John Talbot has also organized a Regional Spotlight Session on behalf of the Section, which brings together scholars and activists to discuss “Fighting Trump’s Deportation Machine in New York City and Connecticut.” These sessions will be followed by a host of intriguing topics at the PEWS Section Roundtables.

On Tuesday morning, a regular session, “Current Topics in World-Systems Research,” will allow us to continue our discussions. A big thanks to Nikhil Deb, Colin Arnold, Manjusha Nair, Jennifer Bair, Beverly Silver, John Talbot, and Patricio Korzeniewicz for organizing these sessions and roundtables!

The PEWS Section Business Meeting will be another great opportunity to come together as we discuss Section business and celebrate our 2019 PEWS Award winners! And don’t forget to join us at our Section Reception, which will be held jointly with the Sections on Global & Transnational Sociology, the Sociology of Development, and Peace, War and Social Conflict. The full lineup of PEWS events at ASA can be found later in the newsletter.

I would like to thank all the volunteers from the membership for their service on various committees. We appreciate your time and commitment to the Section.
Reconciliation Committee: Jennifer Bair, Chris Chase-Dunn, Rob Clark, Albert Fu, Jackie Smith, and Lu Zhang

Committee on Diversity, Equity and Inclusion: Roy Kwon, Devparna Roy

Nominations Committee: Leslie Gates, Sefika Kumral

Membership Committee: Pablo Lapegna, Paul Prew

PEWS Interuniversity Consortium: Chris Chase-Dunn, Valentine Moghadam, and Beverly Silver.

Chris Chase-Dunn and Jackie Smith have also dedicated much time and effort to securing a new editorial team for JWSR.

Finally, my deepest thanks to all the Council members who have devoted their time and energy to the Section, and especially to the outgoing Council members, Marion Dixon and Victoria Reyes, and student representative, Alvin Camba. The energy and enthusiasm you have brought to Council have been greatly appreciated. Welcome to our incoming Council members, Samantha Fox and Irene Pang, and student representative, Daniel Cunha! And a big thanks to Michaela Curran, our webmaster, and Marilyn Grell-Brisk, Jesse Liss, and Zeinab Shuker for all their work putting together this exciting newsletter!

See you in New York!

Amy Quark
PEWS Chair 2018-19
Associate Professor of Sociology
William & Mary
Graduate Student Spotlights

Nikhil Deb and Lefeng Lin

Nikhil Deb is pursuing a doctoral degree at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville and expects to finish in June 2019 (Defense: June 17, 2019). He was born as a religious minority in a remote village without electricity in the South Asian country of Bangladesh.

His research and teaching interests include political economy & globalization, environmental justice and movements, unequal development, and social theory. He came to UTK’s doctoral program as an Assistant Professor of Sociology on leave from the Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Bangladesh. He taught several courses both in Bangladesh and in the US (as a graduate teaching assistant), including Globalization and Justice; Society and Environment; Comparative Poverty and Development; Sociological Theory; Social Movements; and Introduction to Sociology. He has published several articles over the past few years, has a book chapter forthcoming, another under review, and have several papers in preparation for publication.

Dissertation

Deb’s dissertation, “Slow Violence and Movement Resistance by the Gas Peddit in Neoliberal India,” offers a political economic and ecological analysis of the catastrophic, yet slow biosocial and environmental consequences of, and grassroots resistance to, the 1984 Bhopal disaster. The Bhopal disaster caused at least 25,000 deaths and over 600,000 injuries, health defects, and socio-environmental destruction, and is remembered almost exclusively by the spectacle of its immediate aftermaths. Yet few are cognizant of the way in which the slow violence of biosocial and environmental destruction continues to affect marginalized people living in Bhopal, as well as their struggles for social and environmental justice, including clean up of toxic zones, compensation, health care, and importantly, recognition of their rights and memories. More than three decades later, children are born with mental and physical disabilities, and women and girls are plagued with reproductive health problems. To this day, many toxic chemicals left in the abandoned factory continue to contaminate soil and groundwater, affecting more and more marginalized Bhopalis. His dissertation goes beyond the spectacle-driven understanding of the tragedy by examining both the disaster and its ongoing adverse consequences as the
outcomes of political and economic dynamics that create conditions for catastrophes and render invisible the lingering devastation affecting vulnerable populations in peripheral countries.

Based on 60 interviews with Bhopal gas and water sufferers (*Gas Peddit*) and activists, field observations, archives, official and independent reports, and a cross-national dataset on industrial disasters with slow violence, his dissertation argues the following. First, the disaster that happened under a shrinking developmental state was an event in a long chain of global political economic development. Second, prolonged biosocial and environmental destruction is characteristic of India’s neoliberal regime. Third, the process of marginalization of affected Bhopalis in neoliberal India has created a new kind of politics for social and environmental justice, evident in the Bhopal Movement, the longest-running social movement in postcolonial India.

He collected interview, observational, and archival data in two phases. In the first phase, he conducted 40 interviews in Bhopal in the summer of 2018 (July-August). He returned to Bhopal for the second phase of his fieldwork and conducted an additional 20 interviews, as well as observations of anniversary events, and further archival research, in December 2018. Findings of his dissertation suggest that Bhopal is the embodiment of slow violence in neoliberalism, not only because the enduring consequences elude political, judicial, medical, and academic discourse and restitution from governments and corporations, but also because neoliberal actors have tried to suppress the legitimacy of the sufferers’ crises in Bhopal.

**Theorizing Socio-environmental Destruction in Peripheral Countries**

His dissertation, first, puts forward the argument that existing political economic approaches to socioenvironmental destruction do not adequately capture the myriad ways in which such destruction affects poor, minority groups under neoliberalism in peripheral countries. Second, the dissertation argues that long-term socioenvironmental destruction of marginalized groups in the neoliberal, peripheral state creates a form of politics, distinct from both labor and identity politics, that remain largely under-theorized. Taken together, his dissertation theorizes how the process of further marginalizing the marginalized shapes a new form of politics, thus posing a forceful challenge to neoliberal globalization in the global south.

**Awards and others**

In recognition of its creative potential and theoretical and methodological rigor, his dissertation research has been awarded several grants and fellowships, both external and internal, including the 2018 SSSP racial/ethnic minority graduate fellowship. A part of his dissertation has won the 2019 Brent K. Marshall Graduate Student Paper Award from the SSSP Environment and Technology section and is under review for journal publication. Besides conducting research, he enjoys teaching, and his research informs his teaching practices. Over the past decade, he
taught a range of courses, from introductory to advanced, having had the privilege of counseling a diverse body of students. His teaching efforts won several awards, including the 2018 Excellence in Teaching from the UTK Graduate Student Senate, the 2017 Graduate Student Teaching Award from the Department of Sociology, and the 2019 Chancellor’s Citation for Extraordinary Professional Promise for teaching and research.

**Publications**
Nikhil Deb has published four papers and two book reviews over the past few years. While as a graduate student, he authored two papers: a peer-reviewed journal article that focuses on how India responded to the Fukushima meltdown (2018), and a forthcoming boom chapter (with the *Routledge International Edition of Green Criminology*) on the Magurchara gas explosion in Bangladesh that brings together an analysis of state, capital, and law to show how a foreign corporation preyed on the vulnerability of a peripheral state. Currently, I am working on two papers for peer reviewed journal publications.

**Lefeng Lin** is a doctoral candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he is finishing his dissertation, tentatively titled “Polanyian Trap: Trade Union Reform and Labor NGO Activism in South China, 2007-2017.” In this project, he looks at how the state-run trade unions and independent labor NGOs experiment with different strategies to shape the institutionalization of labor unrest in China.

Lefeng grew up in the Workers’ Village in China’s northeast rustbelt, where his dad was a welder in a shipyard, and his mom was a garment worker. As a teenager, Lefeng’s life was intertwined with the turbulent market transition that laid off tens of millions of urban workers, triggering massive labor protests in the country throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Reading Michael Burawoy’s *Politics of Production* and Andrew Walder’s
Communist Neo-Traditionalism inspired Lefeng in this master thesis to explore why the well-organized militant urban workers were marginalized in recent Chinese labor struggles. By working as an apprentice in the shipyard, he observed how globalization, marketization, and reorganization of production on the shop-floor disciplined workers and deprived the workers of organizational resources for building solidarity.

During his doctoral studies, Lefeng began to pay attention to worker insurgency in South China. Reading Beverly Silver’s Forces of Labor, Gay Seidman’s Manufacturing Militance, and Hagen Koo’s Korean Workers led him to explore the dynamics of labor movements in the Pearl River Delta in South China (the epicenter of global labor protests). Central to his work are questions such as how much does Chinese labor struggle reflect the common dynamics under the influence of globalization? How would the process of institutionalizing labor unrest under China’s post-socialist authoritarianism be different from other late industrializers?

With tremendous support and help from Chinese sociologists, labor activists, and progressive state officials, Lefeng gained exceptional access to conduct participant observation in both state-run trade unions and independent labor NGOs for about two years. During weekdays, he was part of a task force working on trade union reform; during his spare time, weekends, and holidays, he participated in worker mobilization with grassroots labor activists. Now, from an insider perspective, Lefeng is writing his dissertation about how the competition between autocrats and activists is reshaping the decade-long process of institutionalization of labor struggles amid China’s integration into the global economy.

Following the completion of his doctoral studies, Lefeng plans to apply for tenure-track faculty positions and relevant post-doctoral positions. He is developing interests in two potential future research projects. One is about transnational labor migration from Southeast Asia to China’s manufacturing and service sectors—a shadow of China’s economic expansion that remains in need of scholarly investigation. His second long-term research project will study rural industrial transformation in China’s hinterland—an aspect of China’s political economy that has received less attention in the scholarship on globalization and China’s development.

Apart from doing research, Lefeng is still supporting labor activism in China. Given that the current Chinese regime takes a hard line in terms of cracking down on civil society and in the sanctioning of academic engaging in activism, Lefeng takes the advantage of being outside the country to help Chinese labor activists design viable projects and apply for grants.

While Lefeng stays busy with research, teaching, and activism, he also makes time for hobbies. Lefeng has been playing competitive soccer games and follows English Premier League. He likes playing trumpet and used to play for a school pip band in China. Lefeng also enjoys going to theater with family for movies, dramas, and symphonies.
Noteworthy
In the PEWS Section

At the ASA Annual Meeting last August, the Section awarded a number of our colleagues for their outstanding scholarly and teaching work. For those who missed ASA last year, here are short pieces highlighting the award winners.

(MGB)

Teaching As A World-Systems Scholar

Jennifer Bickham Mendez
William & Mary

Research Interests
I am a qualitative sociologist with research interests in immigration, social movements, borders, and Latino/a studies. My recent research has focused on understanding the shifting parameters of social inclusion and exclusion within the context of a global political economy. Specifically, through over fifteen years of ethnographic research in Williamsburg, Virginia, my work has explored the local dynamics of immigrants’ place-making and exclusion within the “globalized” U.S. South. Through politically engaged field research I take up the broad question: How do people individually and collectively confront, navigate and sometimes challenge dividing lines that exclude them from participation as full-fledged members of communities and nations? By situating ethnographic research in Williamsburg within a transnational framework, my work has investigated how Central American and Mexican migrants facing dispossession and economic insecurity in their homelands have carved out lives for themselves in a unique settlement site and how such processes are linked to patterns of regional, non-urban gentrification and economic restructuring at the local, regional and global levels. I use the case of immigration flows to Williamsburg to explore how social boundaries that differentiate those who “belong” from those who are deemed “undeserving” are constructed, challenged and reformulated as well as how social differences of gender, race, ethnicity and immigration status are implicated in such boundary-making. I also harbor a strong interest in feminist, activist research methodologies, how globalization complicates these methods but also brings new opportunities for scholar-activists.

“Teaching

In my teaching I strive to foster students’ ability to develop and apply critical, scholarly perspectives to real-world topics. In this way I seek to bring the “global” alive to my students by guiding them through hands-on research experiences that reveal how global forces land in local contexts to contour the daily lives of individuals and communities. To accomplish this, I integrate original research and authentic field experiences into my courses... Collaborative teaching across disciplines has been central to my teaching”
social dynamics and “place-making processes” are contoured by global political-economic forces. I have integrated my undergraduate students into my own research, and they have accompanied me to conduct field research in Williamsburg as well as in four immigrant “sending communities” in Central and Southern Mexico.

I regularly teach my department’s senior capstone course in which students complete independent, empirical research projects. Additionally, my seminar on Latino/a Immigration, Borders and Citizenship, includes a research component, through which students conduct in-depth interviews or engage in field research to gain first-hand exposure to the policy effects and lived realities of immigration.

I am able to offer these research opportunities to my students only after devoting several years to building ties within immigrant communities as well as community and activist organizations and agencies...

my courses engage a variety of pedagogies—mini lectures, interactive, small group activities, class discussion, and film analysis. And I model for students how to apply diverse analytical lenses to course materials drawn from Latin American and Cultural Studies, Sociology, Anthropology as well as the news and popular media.

Collaborative teaching across disciplines has been central to my teaching. In 2009 I co-founded (along with my colleague Silvia Tandeciarz) William & Mary’s Border Studies Program and have co-directed the program four times. This program involves a week-long immersion experience tied to interdisciplinary seminars.

Through a partnership with Borderlinks, a binational non-governmental organization located in Tucson, Arizona, a delegation of students and faculty spend a week traveling on both sides of the US-Mexico border. Together students and faculty meet with humanitarian groups, immigration officials, activists and migrants. They walk migrant trails in the Sonoran desert, spend the night in migrant shelters, and observe immigration hearings at the federal courthouse in Tucson. They enter immigration detention facilities and visit immigrant detainees who share their stories. Along the way they take detailed, ethnographic field-notes, chronicling their activities and encounters with diverse social actors. After the events of each day faculty trip leaders guide evening reflections for students to process and analyze their observations and experiences.
Upon their return to campus Border Studies program students take one of two upper-level seminars offered by the faculty co-directors to deepen their study of human rights, immigration, political economy. Finally, participants in the border program organize an event designed to present what they learned in a way that invites public dialogue about the complex issues surrounding immigration. Students have used various forms of expression to engage a public audience, including photo essays, video documentaries, multi-media presentations, and even teaching modules for middle school and high school classroom use. In 2013 the students, a colleague in Philosophy and I organized a half-day symposium on immigration, which served as a forum for students to engage in dialogue with immigrant advocacy groups, community activists, scholars, NGO practitioners, and policy analysts (some of them alumni) who participated as panelists.

In 2017 we hosted a campus visit from Freedom University, an underground university that provides education, college counseling, and leadership training to undocumented students who are barred from Georgia’s state university system. Students from the Border Studies program were key organizers of this event —hosting the Freedom University students and making them feel welcome. The students and Executive Director Emiko Soltis presented their testimonies to the entire William & Mary community, Freedom University students attended several classes at William & Mary.

"seeing things first-hand, it was completely different than reading in a book or learning about it in class... I was just like [...] able to see more and sympathize more."

While this kind of teaching is not without challenges, most students have reacted positively to these learning opportunities. One alum remarked that my teaching “creat[es] a space for [...] students to grow rather than merely expecting them to reflect back imparted knowledge” and that for her “the whole world became my campus.” Another student described my capstone course as a “great opportunity to push my sociological skills and go out of my comfort zone.” A participant in the Border Studies program remarked on the value of the immersion experience, “seeing things first hand, it was completely different than reading in a book or learning about it in class [...] and my perceptions and things just started to change. I was just like [...] able to see more and sympathize more.”

After twenty years as an instructor I remain passionate about my teaching, and I am committed to spending the remainder of my career striving to offer the very best in educational instruction and learning experiences to my students.
We Who? Colonialism, Silences in our Narrative of Self and the Anticolonial Imagination

Ricarda Hammer

Brown University

Editor’s Note: The award winning article titled “Toward a Sociology of Colonial Subjectivity: Political Agency in Haiti and Liberia” was written by Ricarda Hammer and Alexandre White (Johns Hopkins University).

Picture “a lovely British home, with green lawns, appropriate furnishings and a retinue of well-trained servants,” Du Bois writes. “Within is a young woman, well trained and well dressed, intelligent and high-minded. She is fingering the ivory keys of a grand piano and pondering the problem of her summer vacation, whether in Switzerland or among the Italian lakes; her family is not wealthy, but it has a sufficient “independent” income from investments to enjoy life without hard work. How far is such a person responsible for the crimes of colonialism?” The piano’s ivory keys may be extracted by colonial labor in British Africa, the home’s furniture may be made from mahogany planted in the British West Indies. The family’s income stems from “independent” sources, though benefitting from a booming British economy of the 19th century, economic independence seems to be an oxymoronic idea. The young woman may be part of British middle-class; neither involved in government, nor in high levels of business, nor any other form of elite. For this reason, Du Bois continues, “[i]t will in all probability not occur to her that she has any responsibility whatsoever, and that may well be true.

Equally, it may be true that her income is the result of starvation, theft, and murder; that it involves ignorance, disease, and crime on the part of thousands; that the system which sustains the security, leisure, and comfort she enjoys is based on the suppression, exploitation, and slavery of the majority of mankind.” The condition of possibility, and the flipside to the young woman’s life, Du Bois suggests, is British colonial domination, slavery and colonial labor exploitation, and systematic global dispossession and extraction of resources elsewhere.
He suggests, “[t]he frightful paradox that is the indictment of modern civilization and the cause of its moral collapse is that a blameless, cultured, beautiful young woman in a London suburb may be the foundation on which is built the poverty and degradation of the world” (Du Bois 1965/2015: 41).

My research studies the racialized constructions of the modern body politic in Britain. It investigates the cultural constructions that were necessary to develop political rights for metropolitan British subjects – including the right to hold property, the right to free speech and the right to vote – while at the same time maintaining the colonial project abroad.

**Political Modernity and the Colonial Subject**

In Sociology, we tend to base our modern political vocabulary on the French Revolution or American revolutions. These revolutions overthrew the French monarchy and British colonial power, respectively, strove to locate power in the hands of “the people” and asserted the right for popular self-determination. These revolutions ushered in political modernity and situated ideas of rights and freedom within “Man.”

Yet seemingly universal, these political ideas were deeply racialized. Rights and belonging to the polity depended on power recognizing one’s humanity, and both revolutions excluded their colonial and racialized populations. For a long time, we tended to focus “the social” – our discipline’s object of study after all – as located within the nation state and saw the political processes in the colonies as “aberrations,” “temporal suspensions” or as “colonial exceptions.” However, in order to understand the histories of whiteness and contemporary politics of difference, it is important to hone in on the racialized construction of politics of the imperial project.

In *Black Reconstruction*, W.E.B. Du Bois writes that the “great majority of mankind, on whose bent and broken backs rest today the founding stones of modern industry – shares a common destiny; it is despised and rejected by race and color” (15). Democratization processes amidst colonial and racial projects constructed freedom and emancipation on cultural and racialized frameworks, thus effectively short-circuiting the possibilities for emancipation. And yet, Du Bois writes, “the emancipation of man is the emancipation of labor and the emancipation of labor is the freeing of that basic majority of workers who are yellow, brown and black” (16).

World systems sociologists have long studied the profound inequalities produced by global capitalism. They escaped the analytical confines of the nation state, showing the interconnections and mutual dependency of the world economy. Yet, analyzing the
interactions of colonialism and capitalism, many have thought of global racial formations and imperial constructs as epiphenomenal to its underlying economic structures.

Few have diagnosed how racialization and the global dynamics of dehumanization so central to slavery and the transatlantic slave trade constituted a structuring force of our economies and our polities. If, however, we were to focus on global racialization and the centrality of slavery in the making of the modern world, our political vocabulary would change. While metropolitan politics forged liberal democracies, these principles inevitably excluded colonial subjects. The colonies were outside the “territory of rights,” almost never part of our sociological analyses and analytically bifurcated from social processes we tend to study.

Recent postcolonial sociological interventions have highlighted how empires were not only central in forging the modern world but also shaped our knowledge production. Written from the perspective of the metropole, many sociological inquiries speak to a series of preoccupations arising from this particular metropolitan standpoint (Bhambra 2007; Go 2016). In short, the modern sciences came about during the heyday of Western imperialism, so our knowledge structures reflect these social orders.

In fact, modernity as a sociological concept gained its meaning in opposition to the non-modern. Resituating the birth of the modern social sciences within this position in the global world system allows us to see how claims to neutral knowledge creation are in fact locally, culturally and socially situated. Once we accept that sociology is deeply embedded in knowledge cultures that define what structures objectivity and legitimate knowledge mean; and that these meaning structures were shaped by the colonial world system that gave it rise, we can wonder what it would mean to intentionally situate our knowledge claims against this “imperial episteme.”

The emergence of natural rights theory in Britain animated the myth of the “free-born Englishman.” The rule of law was meant to hold universal character and apply equally “king and pauper alike.” However, by 1661, British settlers formalized the slavery system through imposing the Barbados Slave Codes, setting up a parallel legal system to English common law, taking away that most fundamental of rights – the right to life – for enslaved people. And yet, even though the law codified the dehumanization processes slavery had imposed, the slave codes held provisions for how to negotiate incidents of slave rebellions, those very moments when the enslaved person who had been rendered
into a commodity acted to shape the course of history.

Britain abolished slavery in 1833 but the change in legal status merely shifted racial orders. In Jamaica, for example, throughout the 19th century, economic and political conditions improved little, so black Jamaicans could not put their civil rights into practice. Towards the end of the century, while British metropolitan working men gained the right to vote in 1865, their colonial counterparts were met with one of the most brutal episodes of colonial state violence. (Winston Branch - *West Indian*, 1973)

Jamaican colonial subjects protested the island’s stark inequalities and the colonial governor opened fire on the protesters, killing hundreds, setting houses on fire and brutally suppressing political action of what were, after all, British subjects, who were meant to be under the protection of the Queen. The British *Pall Mall Gazette* captured the colonial use of temporality in 1866: “[S]ecuring civil rights to a people is one thing and conferring on them political privileges is another; that all races and all classes are entitled to justice, but that all are not fit or ready for self-government.”

These histories show that a series of cultural structures defined what it meant to be a citizen. It constructed metropolitan workers as rights-claiming subjects, who came to be fit to hold the right to vote, while black workers needed to be ruled with a strong hand in order to progress towards political modernity. We often conceptualize political rights as an abstract set of rules, handed down from inanimate historical documents. Yet, the meaning of who can be a rights-bearing agent comes out of a very specific meaning system that continues to have effects on our political vocabulary today. Colonial rule and the racialized constructions of its subjects are not “exceptions” to sociological narratives of democratization and progress, but they are in fact an important part of the very same story.

In our PEWS award-winning article titled “Toward a Sociology of Colonial Subjectivity: Political Agency in Haiti and Liberia,” Alexandre White and I draw out the sociological possibilities for studying the political imagination of colonized and (formerly) enslaved people. The revolutionaries in Saint Domingue – now Haiti – revolted not just against their colonial overseers but also against the institution of slavery. The early
founders of Liberian Republicanism offer yet another historical example, that envisions antiracist nationalism to a larger world system in which black self-determination had otherwise been unthinkable.

In both cases, political leaders understood that their metropolitan counterparts forged a body politic that systematically excluded racialized peoples and colonial subjects. Speaking from their position as colonial subjects, Haitian and Liberian political leaders made claims to freedom that went far beyond what we find in the declarations of the American or French revolutions. They therefore created different justifications for freedom and independence and instituted themselves as novel subjects in the world system, as free, self-governing black people.

Through the signification process accompanying protest action, they [Haitian leaders] made possible, for the first time in world history, the possibility of a Black, free, self-governing state. These documents served to justify their existence not just to a domestic ruling class but a world order where racialized slavery was in full swing.

Amidst Caribbean islands that were still rattled by colonial slavery, Haitians constructed citizenship and belonging based on a politically anticolonial position. Moreover, the Haitian state even offered a home for black people, thus effectively extending citizenship beyond its national borders. Studying the long-standing historical struggles in which colonized subjects responded to colonial structures and sought ways to escape them gives us a new, more universal, political lineage. Theorizing from the perspective of colonial subjects enables sociology to begin to understand the politics around global racial formations and starts to incorporate histories of black agency into the sociological canon.

This approach is of course not new but has a long history in the Black Radical Tradition. Grounded in analyses of racial capitalism, this body of thought explains the mutual reinforcements and inseparability of historically-existing global capitalism, and with it turns our attention to political imaginations that arise from these subordinate positions in the social system.

While the West is at a crossroads between the resurgence of ethno-nationalist sentiments or a seeming inability to reconcile questions of refugee “crises,” this tradition of thought
explains how we got here. Being “in but not of Europe” allows anticolonial writers to shed light on whiteness’ sense of self, even when metropolitan societies invest in forgetting and separating themselves from the colonial past. As James Baldwin (1965) wrote, “History does not refer merely, or even principally, to the past. On the contrary, the great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us and are unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all we do.” Reconstructing our sense of self from this colonial history must be part of dealing with the legacies forged by racial capitalism.

**The Nation state, Whiteness and Legacies of Colonialism**

“I am not a liberal Englishman like you,” Stuart Hall told a journalist in 2007. “In the back of my head are things that can't be in the back of your head. That part of me comes from a plantation, when you owned me. I was brought up to understand you, I read your literature, I knew "Daffodils" off by heart before I knew the name of a Jamaican flower.” Born in 1932, Hall was part of a generation of British colonial subjects that knew England, its colonial history and its construction of whiteness better than it knows itself. Growing up during the last bouts of British colonial rule, immersed in the colonial school system, Hall’s family’s aspirations were oriented toward England, embedding him in “a lower-middle class family that was trying to be a middle-class Jamaican family trying to be an upper-middle class Jamaican family trying to be an English Victorian family” (Hall, 1987, p. 45). All aspirations were oriented towards England.

The colonial project made it impossible to separate the objective and the subjective for colonial contradictions shaped the sense of self, breaching into the very intimacy of the family and shaping the core of who we think we are. Colonized subjects found themselves “displaced from the center of the world” (Hall in Meeks 2007, p.272), seemingly having to “catch up” with the modern world, from which they were temporally and spatially displaced.

Despite the long-standing historical entanglements between histories of democratization and colonial slavery, in the years of imperial decline, Britain began to conceive itself as a nation, seeking to impose the narrative of Britain as an “island story.” Ironically, with decolonization Britain sought to rid itself from the increasingly “troublesome” colonial project. Sociologists similarly tended to reinforce the very logic of post-decolonization nation states, reinforcing the inside/outside binary and aiding in the forgetting of colonial histories as constitutive of who “we” are. When British Caribbean subjects travelled to England...
following the call for labour after World War 2, British sociologists – influenced by the Chicago school’s assimilation paradigm – began to study the newly visible “black presence” in Britain, analyzing the community’s ability to “adapt” to a seemingly fully formed British nation. In perpetrating imperial aphasia, migration scholarship contributed the expertise to displace the former colonial populations and the colonized found themselves subjected to dominant regimes of representation that normalize their position of inferiority. However, British colonial subjects came on a British passport.

If national formation stories do not reflect colonial entanglements, then citizens of the Commonwealth find their belonging questioned. In fact, without analyzing how colonial powers shaped the history of who counts as a human and who does not, we fail to see how the right to belong was socially and historically constructed. For Stuart Hall, those who cannot see themselves reflected in a nation’s mirror cannot belong. “Identity,” he writes, “is formed at the unstable point where the “unspeakable” stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture.” What is more, failing to explain whiteness’ histories of violence perpetuates a sense of self that is neither empirically accurate nor helpful in addressing contemporary challenges, including Brexit, anxieties and a loss of identity, racial violence or the perpetuation of global inequalities.

Following our traditional human rights narratives that seems to originate Europe, the colonized subject comes to confront political modernity and the nation state, from the outside. However, as the long history of cultural and colonial constructions of the rights-bearing agent shows, the possibility to attain rights is racialized. For former colonial subjects, in order to attain rights in a nation state and unquestionably become a member of the polity, to become modern politically, often times means to become Western culturally. To quote Caryl Phillips, the utopian task is to “be colored English.”

A dive into colonial history shows more than anything that colonial subjects were excluded from rights discourses in order to perpetuate the very colonial project taking place alongside metropolitan democratization efforts. Tracing colonial connections shows how much the colonies are inextricably tied to metropolitan societies, and how they are, in Hall’s words, “always the sugar at the bottom of the English cup of tea.” What is more, to enable a truly global imagination of who can hold rights we need to reconstruct how global entanglements shaped who we are and how we see ourselves.
Rethinking the Evolution of the Capitalist World-Economy in the Longue Durée

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There is growing awareness that the rise of a cluster of countries from the global South— including countries that account for a significant percentage of world population such as China and India—has been altering existing global stratification of wealth as well as trends of between-country inequality. The literature has contradictory interpretations about these ongoing changes in light of dominant paradigms of international development.

One popular interpretation is that these trends support the claims of the modernization theory, which had greatly been discredited by the critique it received from the dependency school and the world-systems analysts. Actually, since the 1990s, several efforts have been made to revive the modernization theory of the post-World War II era.

Many neoclassical economists started to propagate the idea that all countries could enjoy the standards of wealth enjoyed by advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America if they follow the neoliberal reforms suggested by the IMF and the World Bank. Heterodox economists and political scientists who are skeptical to such simplistic neoclassical reforms started to suggest that all countries can “develop” only if they establish inclusive and democratic institutions as done in Western countries.
In the same period, many prominent sociologists such as Edward Tiryakian, Jeffrey Alexander and Wolfgang Zapf also started to argue that the fall of the U.S.S.R and the Eastern Bloc countries and the rise of East Asia falsified the claims of the dependistas and the world-systemists, made it imperative to take modernization theory seriously once again and to reformulate it as a major paradigm.

Despite such efforts until the early 21st century there was no strong empirical evidence to support the claims of these neo-modernization or “Modernization II” theories. For instance, in the sphere of global political economy, the argument that modernization or globalization decreases global inequality and helps undeveloped countries to catch up with the rest of the world appeared to be false as repeatedly shown by research conducted by world-systems scholars including Giovanni Arrighi, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Patricio Korzeniewicz and Tim Moran, and Salvatore Babones to name a few.

Series of research conducted by world-systems analysts confirmed that while certain countries could move up and down in the global income hierarchy, the hierarchical structure of the capitalist world-system - which was characterized by a small core region, a slightly larger group of semi-periphery and a huge periphery - remained fundamentally unaltered.

Since the turn of the 21st century, together with the rise of many highly populated countries in the global South, these empirical trends have started to change and to produce fundamental changes in the global hierarchies of wealth and power. A growing chorus of scholars has started to argue that inequality between countries has started to decline for the first time since the industrial revolution.

There has been no agreement on how this process happened, so many started to believe that such developments have started to reverse the “great divergence” process that had initially produced the overwhelming income and wealth disparity between the “West” and the “rest”, or put differently between the global north and the global south. For neo-modernization theories of the 21st century, there is no better evidence than the rapid economic growth of China, India and many other peripheral countries of the global South at the turn of the twenty first century.

Although many critical scholars of international political-economy and global economic sociology are skeptical to the claims of neo-modernization theories, they do not directly challenge these arguments. Most critical scholars opt to turn attention to the rising within-country inequality trends.
all, it is not a secret that regardless of what is happening at the global between-country inequality patterns, within country inequality trends have rapidly been increasing in many parts of the world.

While this observation is true, it does not address main questions at hand. Are we seeing a great convergence process at the global level or not? If we do, how is such convergence possible under a capitalist world-economy? Does the rise of global South support or challenge expectations and predictions by the modernization theory? Can these trends be properly explained by dependency theory, which claimed that capitalist relations on a global scale can only produce polarization.

Can the world-systems approach, which claimed that while a few individual countries can change their position in the world hierarchy, fundamental structure of the global division of labor (e.g. core, semi-periphery, periphery structure) would remain unchanged, properly explain these trends? Is the rise of the global South a completely novel and unprecedented development?


“in the sphere of global political economy the argument that modernization or globalization decreases global inequality and helps undeveloped countries to catch up with the rest of the world appeared to be false”

Methodologically, the article starts from the premise that only a longue durée analysis of transformations of global hierarchies of wealth, can help distinguish novel features of contemporary transformations from recurrent dynamics of historical capitalism, and assesses the explanatory power of competing paradigms. Building upon this premise, the article extends Arrighi and Drangel’s (1986) method of conceptualizing, operationalizing, and measuring the global distribution of wealth within the capitalist world-economy through the adoption of new statistical and comparative-historical analyses and a longue durée perspective.

By analyzing global hierarchies of wealth from sixteenth century to present, the article puts forward two novel arguments. First, it shows that the trimodal (core-semiperiphery-periphery) structure of the capitalist world-economy, which remained relatively stable from the 1930s to the 1990s, has been dissolving in front of our eyes since the mid-1990s.
This dissolution, together with the deepening of the crisis of US world hegemony, has been producing a new four-tiered (i.e., quadrimodal) structure since the turn of the 21st century. Second, it argues that this transformation is neither evidence for modernization theory nor a symptom of the demise of the capitalist world-economy. This is because from the sixteenth century to the present, the hierarchical structure of the capitalist world-economy has been fundamentally transformed during each period of world hegemonic crisis and systemic chaos.

These successive reconfigurations of the global hierarchy of wealth have occurred during intensified periods of crisis because in order to survive crisis,

(a) historical capitalism expanded and incorporated new territories for capital accumulation and

(b) global relocation of finance capital produced new geographical centers of production and trade as well as new zones for exploitation, surplus production, and resource appropriation.

As a result of these transformations, the distribution of the global hierarchy of wealth in the capitalist world-economy has, from one systemic crisis to the next, been superseded by more complex forms.

More specifically, the article re-conceptualizes the core-periphery structure of the capitalist world-economy as a complex system with punctuated equilibria which reproduces existing hierarchies during periods of world hegemonies but radically transforms them during periods of world hegemonic crisis. Empirical and comparative-historical analysis presented in the article documents that global hierarchy of wealth was not always trimodal. For instance, the global hierarchy was characterized by a unimodal distribution during the Dutch world hegemony without an empirically visible core-periphery differentiation.

This unimodal structure has demised and produced to a bimodal distribution (a core-periphery structure) during the crisis of the Dutch world-hegemony and the transition to the British world-hegemony. Emergent bimodal core-periphery structure was stabilized during the British world hegemony but transformed into a trimodal distribution (core-semiperiphery-periphery structure) during the crisis of the British world hegemony and transition to the US world hegemony.

During the U.S. world hegemony, this trimodal distribution remained relatively stable. Since most of the empirical analysis on the core-periphery structure was conducted during this era due to availability of data, including the Arrighi-Drangel (1986) research, most analyses confirmed the existence of the relatively stable tri-modal distribution and the core-semiperiphery-periphery structure as predicted by traditional world-systems analysis.

However, in recent decades, in the era of intensified crisis of the U.S. world hegemony, this trimodal distribution been shifting to a new emergent pattern – a four-tiered quadrimodal distribution. Thus, major transformations in the global hierarchy of wealth, such as the one
we see today, have been a recurrent tendency of the capitalist world-economy, which survives crises through transformation of its operations as explained by Marx and Schumpeter.

Moreover, the analysis presented in the article also debunk various myths about neo-modernization theories. Findings show that the radical transformations we have been observing have not been occurring in the way predicted by modernization theories. For one thing, from 16th century to present, there was no essential change in the “core” regions. The percentage of the world population residing in “core” locations remained essentially the same since the initial emergence of the core-periphery differentiation in the early 19th century.

Likewise, the article shows that it is not the first time we see such radical changes in global inequality structure since the industrial revolution either. On the contrary, in every period of systemic crisis in capitalist world-economy, from 16th century to present, analogous transformations have taken place resulting in the reconfiguration of the non-core locations.

Most importantly, the article concludes that a “catching-up process” where a majority of the world population reaches the standards of wealth enjoyed by core countries (i.e. a unimodal distribution around core position) —as expected by modernization theory— seems neither likely nor sustainable. Sustaining the standards of wealth for just 15 percent of the population currently residing in core locations has led to the destruction of livelihoods of the vast majority of the working classes and of the environment in a catastrophic and irreversible way.

The world’s human and environmental resources cannot possibly sustain this generalized “catching-up” process. A just and sustainable global distribution of wealth can only be achieved if core countries move down in the global wealth hierarchy by de-accumulating capital.
Venezuela’s transition from a capitalist client state of Western cores to a staunchly anti-imperialistic socialist state has captivated international attention since Hugo Chávez began campaigning across the country on horseback. Yet, its fate now rests in the spotlight of global scrutiny focusing on resource mismanagement, infrastructural collapse, extrajudicial violence, collusion with drug cartels. This piece surveys network data (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002) in order to address the broad question of how the 5th Republic’s position in the import-export and foreign aid networks has changed during the transition between the 4th Republic and the 5th, and what domestic and geopolitical forces may be mediating this development.

Domestically, the Chávez administration was successful due to the charismatic exploits of its leader, particularly during the 5th Republic’s early days, but it is important to note the economic shortcomings of previous administrations, most notably in their failure to diversify the export economy beyond oil and other natural resources, which placed the bolívar in a precarious state of unpredictable flux. The country’s economic hardships traditionally became the burden of the underclass during the 4th Republic, a structural reality that continues to fuel the Chavista-Madurista rhetoric to the present day. The 5th Republic made an overt attempt to reverse this centuries-old colonial/imperial mode of class reproduction, modeling parts of its radical reforms after post-1959 Cuba. However, fiscal mismanagement, resource scarcity, a lack of industry diversification, and growing corruption among public administrators loyal to Chávez eroded many voters’ faith in Chávez’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV); this became evident in the country’s electoral outcomes after 2006, which saw a gradually rising opposition to the established 5th Republic’s proposed policies.

Geopolitically, Venezuela’s relationship with the US and Russia shifted drastically from the 4th to the 5th Republic, and came to emulate Castro’s model, after which Venezuela served as a model for similar movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and more recently, Mexico. This is partly a consequence of the United States’ waning military and economic prevalence, at least in Latin America, relative to that of Russia (and China, whose military
and economic presence in Venezuela’s current development is not to be overlooked).

Independent of these geopolitical shifts among global powers, however, the Marxian position that Chavismo takes with respect to the US paints the current hegemon as a ubiquitously imperialist power whose capitalist modes of resource extraction left the resource-rich tropical nation-state impoverished by the end of the 20th century. Henceforth, capitalism and the US are officially regarded as inseparable by the state-managed media, and both are incompatible with the 5th Republic’s romanticizing of the Castrista legacy of sovereignty or death.

The vacuum left in the wake of the withdrawal of the US from Venezuela, diplomatically and otherwise, has been filled by Russia and China. Though not empirically explored in this study, an important factor in the decline of Venezuela’s economic momentum is reduced oil revenues, stemming largely from decreased Chinese demand. In the midst of these factors, this study traces the course of various properties of Venezuela’s trade and foreign aid relations with the intent to describe how fluctuations in these attributes may have been influenced by each period of its recent development.

To account for the highly transitional state of the nation politically and economically, five distinct periods are qualitatively evident within the temporal span of the analysis. The first period (1980 – 1982) that establishes the end of a half-century of currency stability for the oil-infused bolívar. The second period (1983 – 1992) spans a decade’s worth of devaluation of the bolívar, and culminates with Chavez’s failed coup, and his consequent imprisonment. Period 3 (1993 – 1998) is characterized by tensions coinciding with President Pérez’s impeachment on corruption charges, and a general instability in the Presidency that followed. Chávez is released from prison in 1994, and wins the 1998 election. Period 4 (1999 – 2006) begins with Chávez’s assumption of the Presidency, dismantling the legislative structure of the 4th Republic, and replacing it with that of the 5th.

This socialist honeymoon period gives rise to the Pink Tide ripple effect throughout Latin America (see Chase-Dunn, Morosin, and Álvarez 2015), and sees great gains in the redistribution of land and wealth to formerly disenfranchised sectors of the population. Its peak foreshadows the decline of Chávez’s popularity and international support, particularly after Venezuela signs a $3-billion arms deal with Russia. The nationalization and appropriation of major media companies, agricultural lands, and essential industries lead to economic instability as well as popular criticism of the administration.
The final period used in the analysis (2007 – 2013) begins with the PSUV suffering electoral defeats, particularly with respect to referendums aimed at centralizing the Presidency’s power of appropriation of private assets. Venezuela’s shift from its prior primary benefactor—the US—to Russia is evident in Venezuela’s increased exports of petroleum and other natural resources to Russia. The eroding stability of the economy and sociolegal structure coincide with hyperinflation, price controls, a shrinking economy, and the abolition of term limits for elected officials. The period ends with the gradual recession of the Pink Tide throughout Latin America, the death of President Chávez, and Nicolás Maduro’s ascension to the Presidency.

Since then, more than 3 million Venezuelans have fled to neighboring countries or overseas, and while this study does not delve empirically into the Maduro Administration, it serves as a backdrop for the polarized, chaotic, and vitriolic sociopolitical context in which Maduro and his associates have risen to prominence, and for the state of the nation at the time of this publication. A discrete analysis of each these periods offers a glimpse into shorter-term processes—both domestic and geopolitical—and qualitative uniquenesses that characterize each stage of the country’s economic and sociopolitical development.

This study builds upon Álvarez’s (2016) network analysis of trade (Barbieri 2009, 2016) and foreign aid (Roodman 2012) relationships at the level of the world-system, focusing instead on Venezuela’s ego networks (see Hanneman and Riddle, 2005, pp. 171–192) throughout the period of interest. The degree to which Venezuela’s exports offset the country’s imports is proxied by the quotient of the country’s exports (numerator) and imports (denominator) in the trade network. Venezuela’s import and export centralities indicate the country’s trade relations relative to the world’s total international trade, accounting for the monetary intensity of each
trade relationship. Similarly, its centrality in the trade network as a receiver of foreign aid proxies the degree to which countries are donating to Venezuela vis-à-vis other recipient nations. Lastly, the number of countries that donate financial assistance to Venezuela adds to the discussion of Venezuela’s reception of foreign aid.

These two measures of centrality then exhibited cycles with decreasing levels of equilibrium until the advent of the 5th Republic at the turn of the century, when an upswing from 2003 to 2008 led to a return to previous (i.e., 4th Republic) equilibrium levels.

Venezuela’s foreign aid is characterized by a spike in during the Pérez Administration of the late 1980s and early 90s (which Chávez attempted to overthrow), and a second spike in 1999 when Chávez took office. Upon this transition, the number of foreign aid donor countries doubled (see Figure 2), emphasizing the periodicity of this development; the 20 or so traditional donor countries during the 4th Republic (mainly Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and the US) were joined in efforts to aid Venezuela financially by more than 20 donor nations, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The Chávez Administration increased its import spending relative to its export revenues during its early years, which decreased the export-to-import quotient over Period 4, recovering during Period 5.

Several attribute pairs yield statistically significant, lagged correlations, the most notable of which is evident in the relationship between import centrality (not illustrated herein) and the export-to-import quotient, suggesting that a 7-year lag exists between the centrality of the country’s import sector in the world-economy and its significant 

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0.01) correlation with the export-to-import quotient. However, an inverse relationship between the number of foreign aid donors and the export-to-import quotient is significant ($p < 0.01$) with or without a lag of up to 5 years, suggesting at least the possibility that as the number of foreign aid donor nations to Venezuela rises, the nation invests more in its domestic production, thereby increasing over the course of about 7 years its output and consequent exports relative to what it acquires from other nations.

Geopolitical pressure from core powers and other interests played a mediating role in the course of the nation’s development towards a precarious—though not isolationist—state, and perhaps towards the reactionary transformation of Venezuelan economic, diplomatic, and executive policies. Though it did not become more centralized than its 4th Republic predecessor in terms of trade or foreign aid, the 5th Republic significantly intensified the import and export sectors of its economy, and at least initially enjoyed the bolstering effects of a sharp spike in foreign assistance from a cadre of new, semiperipheral donors. Chávez’s vision of a more prosperous and egalitarian Venezuela, particularly during Period 4, was largely facilitated by global assistance and a gradual increase in trade, without which the Bolivarian Revolution may never have gotten underway. Notwithstanding, given the current political trajectory of Latin America, it is both by irony and tragedy that the cradle of the Pink Tide movement should now serve as its most prominent cautionary tale.

**Works Cited**


1. Introduction

On October 28, 2018, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected President of Brazil in a run-off against the left-wing Worker’s Party (PT) candidate, Fernando Haddad. Bolsonaro ran for the presidential office as a member of the (by then) small, right-wing conservative Social Liberal Party (PSL), his ninth party in around 29 years as a politician. His running mate was the little before retired army general Hamilton Mourão. Bolsonaro managed to capture the anti-PT vote, a decisive factor that led many voters to choose, in favor of him, what they saw as a contest, in the run-off, between two political evils.

His victory was a shock for many analysts, not completely unlike Trump’s victory. Bolsonaro had been a very newsworthy federal representative for almost three decades, but much of his media exposure was derived from his willingness to say - and later to deny having said it - outrageously politically incorrect phrases. His opponents and many others would say that those phrases were not just “politically incorrect”, but, in fact, pure hate speech. Be that as it may, he had always been seen by most as a cartoonish politician, elected by a niche vote, originally composed mostly by members of the security apparatus, usually from its lower echelons, and often part of the Brazilian precariat.

Many would say that his victory was due to an improbable amount of “electoral serendipity”. First, there was the inability of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), the major center-right party, to nominate a viable candidate. Its candidate Aécio Neves, who was narrowly beaten by Dilma Rousseff (later impeached on charges of mismanagement of public funds) in the run-off election in 2014, suffered a major blow, on what seemed to be an easy path to win, after his name was involved in a high profile corruption case the year before. Geraldo Alckmin, the former governor of the richest of Brazilian states, São Paulo, and his successor in the ballot, never managed to become a viable candidate.

Added to that, Democratic Labour Party’s (PDT) Ciro Gomes, a left leaning politician and an alternative to PT’s Haddad that was potentially more palatable to a population largely biased against Lula’s party, failed to beat Haddad to the second election round.

After former president Lula was arrested for corruption-related crimes (a decision that many of his supporters and left leaning voters consider one-sided and politically charged) and had his candidacy blocked by the Electoral Justice, he was still able to influence
the campaign from behind bars. However, before the first round of elections, Bolsonaro was brutally attacked by a mentally unstable man. He was stabbed in the abdomen during a rally and critically injured. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that such attack politically hurt Lula as much as it physically hurt Bolsonaro. Lula was out of the spotlight and no longer seen as the sole victim of injustice. Surviving the attack after emergency surgery, Bolsonaro got precious sympathetic media coverage. He could now claim that, in spite of being accused of inciting hate and violence, the major victim of actual violence during the campaign was himself.

Those accidental events made it possible for Bolsonaro to win the election. Only that rare set of favorable conditions made it possible for him to inherit the anti-PT vote.

The campaign was marked by an alarming level of polarization and violence. Politically-related violence had been already on the rise in Brazil. Human rights activist Marielle Franco had been executed by shots from a passing car in Rio in March 2018. So far, the crime remains unsolved. Bolsonaro, as mentioned, was stabbed. Shots were fired in political events. Beatings were common. People got killed in politics-fueled brawls. Online abuse, with incredible levels of hate, was also very common. Rumours spread moral panic on both sides of the political spectrum. Not a good time for Brazil.

2. How big was Bolsonaro’s victory?
Voting in Brazil is compulsory, but failing to do so will usually imply only some very low fines or even just some bureaucratic nuisance. From the more than 147 million registered voters, more than 31 million (c. 21.3%) failed to do so. On top of that, from those that did vote, around 11 million (c. 9.5%) of them voted blank or null, so they were counted out of the final set of valid votes that decided the election. In the end, Bolsonaro was declared winner with more than 57.7 million votes (55.13% of the valid votes and c. 39.2% of the total), against a little more than 47 million votes (44.87% of the valid votes and c. 31.9% of the total) for Haddad.

At first glance, Bolsonaro’s victory may not look very impressive. Out of Brazil’s eight presidential elections since the end of the military regime, his share of votes was larger than only Fernando Collor’s in 1989 (53%) and Dilma Rousseff’s in 2010 (51.6%), not to mention that Fernando Henrique Cardoso won twice in the first round, in 1994 and 1998.

But that impression would be wrong. In 2014, Bolsonaro’s party, the PSL, won 1 out of 513 seats in the lower house and 0 of 81 seats in the Senate. In 2018, in a result largely... caused by Bolsonaro becoming a member, the PSL won 52 seats in the lower house and [7] out of 81 in the Senate
exclusively, caused by Bolsonaro becoming a member, the PSL won 52 seats in the lower house and 4 out of 81 in the Senate. Three more Senators were added after the election by representatives that moved in from other parties. This made PSL the second largest party in the lower house, just behind PT, and the 8th largest out of 16 parties represented in the upper house, even if still far away from having the number of seats needed for a majority.

Bolsonaro also got impressive results in the country’s largest cities. In São Paulo, the largest Brazilian city with more than 12 million people (metro area: 21 million), Bolsonaro got more than 60% of the valid votes in the runoff, against less than 40% by his opponent and former mayor of the city, Fernando Haddad. In the city of Rio de Janeiro, his political base, results were even more impressive, with 66.35% to 33.65% of the votes. Bolsonaro won in every electoral district in the city but for Laranjeiras, a middle class neighbourhood. Overall, he won the election in 21 of the 26 state capitals, plus the Federal District, where the national capital, Brasília, is located. All in all, Bolsonaro won 15 states plus the Federal District, against 11 states for Haddad.

Bolsonaro sons, Eduardo and Flávio, were also elected. Eduardo was elected federal representative by the state of São Paulo with more than 2 million votes, a historical record for the country. Flávio was elected Senator by the state of Rio de Janeiro. A third son, Carlos, is a municipal representative ("vereador") in Rio de Janeiro, since 2001, when he was elected at the age of 17 years. Since the election, they have all played an important role, even if clumsy and messy, in Bolsonaro’s political strategy.

But things are not meant to be easily understandable or predictable in Brazil. Bolsonaro’s victory has led to what many see as “bolsonarism’s debacle” and the rise of a silent and discreet rule by his Vice-President Hamilton Mourão; a person that seems, at least for the moment, to please Brazilian society much more than Bolsonaro does.

3. But who’s really in charge?
Once elected, bolsonarism quickly used up a significant amount of Bolsonaro’s political capital. His sons Eduardo and Carlos have gotten entangled in politically unprofitable, high-profile online kerfuffles on a daily, if not hourly, basis. His son Flávio is now accused of some questionable practices regarding public money, possibly corruption. The few ministers chosen by him, have failed to impose, so far, a viable agenda for their offices. Further, their behavior is viewed by many as erratic at best.

“More and more, Bolsonaro seems to be a stranger in what is supposed to be his own government, saying things that contradict his own ministers or even himself…”
For many analysts, from the start, Bolsonaro has faced internal competition for power. Currently, there are at least three factions sharing power in the government: Bolsonaro, Mourão and the ex-military personnel, and the economists, led by Paulo Guedes, the minister responsible for economic decisions. It is unclear, right now (early March, 2019), who holds the most power. However, it does not appear to be Bolsonaro’s faction.

Hamilton Mourão is now seen, by a growing part of the population, as the “real” Brazilian president. Mourão has, so far, acted as a rational, sensible person, and respect for him is now widespread. Even among leftists, who usually disagree from his opinions, his words and acts have often brought relief. He appears to be making it less and less probable that the most feared aspects of a Bolsonaro government would ever come true. He may even have already conquered some yet-too-ashamed-to-confess-it hearts and minds in the nationalistic Left.

“Standing courageously against barbaric behavior has already proved insufficient to win elections and stay in power.”

But that does not mean, that Bolsonaro is close to being toppled from power. He still holds a strong grip on his almost fanatical core constituency— perhaps as much as 10-15% of Brazilian society. Moreover, his antics still make him a master at grabbing the Brazilian media’s attention, deflecting it from more politically sensitive issues. That makes him extremely useful for the other groups in power. But “being useful to others in power” is not the most impressive defining line in any presidential CV.

Lastly, and very importantly, the Brazilian Left has been so busy paying close attention and reacting with furious glee to those antics, almost to the point of establishing a sort of ongoing “he-said, we-said” unplanned but quite popular reality show, that a serious alternative to the government’s political and economic plan is missing. It is clear right now that the Brazilian Left is 100% against Bolsonaro; it is less clear what that Left stands for. How it will carry Brazil from point A (today’s reality) to point B (tomorrow’s desirable society), is anybody’s guess. Standing courageously against barbaric behavior has already proved insufficient to win elections and stay in power. But not much more has been delivered by the Left; not unlike other parts of the West. Mayoral elections (a big thing in Brazil) in 2020 will shed more light on the Left’s real electoral standing.

Many point to the neoliberal nature of Bolsonaro’s government. Indeed, nobody would call it progressive. In fact, so far, there has been little in-depth discussion of the PT policy of stimulating consumption based on debt (*cidadania pelo consumo*), which has done more for the neoliberal cause in Brazil than perhaps anything else. One could argue that Brazil’s case should make it clear, that stimulating consumption does not replace
stimulating social solidarity as a political agenda and that social solidarity is not obtained by stimulating consumption, even when the latter is needed for economic reasons. And, needless to say, being a leftist does not discharge a politician from the duty of not being corrupt.

4. Post-Bolsonaro Brazil

It may seem too early to talk about a post-Bolsonaro Brazil. However, it is not too early. For many years, he has represented something that was absolutely unacceptable to a majority of Brazilians, even if laughable at times. For a sizeable part of the population, he is “o mito” (“the myth”, his nickname among followers); for an equally sizeable part of the population, he is a political abomination, a dangerous would-be dictator. After his stunning victory, however, he appears to be just a politician that was used by much stronger political forces to be an anti-PT, unavoidable medicine; one whose collateral damages are not that difficult to control.

This text was finished on March 10, 2019. Things are unfolding quickly in Brazil, so it will probably already be in need of an update when published. But by now it looks as if Bolsonaro is no longer capable of exerting much real influence over the government. And his sons are now in an almost open political battle against Mourão, in what seems to be a very bad political decision. More and more, Bolsonaro seems to be a stranger in what is supposed to be his own government, saying things that contradict his own ministers or even himself. He has left them denying or correcting what he says, often creating an even bigger mess in the process. At times he even he seems to be unaware of what is going on around him in the government.

Examples abound of the almost unbelievably clumsy way he has dealt so far with the debate surrounding the social security overhaul. The constant need for General Mourão to “explain” what Bolsonaro had meant to say the day before feeds rumors that he is now under threat of an informal gag order from other sectors in the government. Even if that is not true, and there is no confirmation so far that it is, the simple fact that such an absurd idea is perfectly believable and acceptable for Brazilians, does not augur a good future for his time in government.

There is now a Shakespearean flavor in Bolsonaro’s fate. His political presence, which initially appeared to be a huge threat for some and a huge hope for others, quickly turned into a sad, almost pitiable public display of deep inadequacy and continuous self-inflicted embarrassment. The proverbial commoner that pays a very high price for having
challenged his lot in life, and cursed in the process by getting what he wanted. Some among his former supporters have already expressed publicly their reservations concerning issues involving his government.

One cannot downplay the intolerance, hate and violence that plagues Brazil, especially against minorities. Not at all. But, perhaps what makes the situation more worrying, is that it is becoming more clear every day that Bolsonaro was more of a symptom rather than a cause of it.

So, as strange as it sounds, post-Bolsonaro Brazil is already on the horizon. Of course, things can change. Bolsonaro may yet come back strong. But, the mostly silent acceptance of Mourão as the “real president” by a number of Brazilians, and the exhaustion of Brazilian society, points to a much less catastrophic outcome than one could expect just a few months ago.

Is there any good perspectives for the Brazilian Left? Well, it depends on what is accepted as “good perspective”. Most certainly, leftists parties and candidates will be able to win elections, maybe even the next presidential one. But without a viable economic alternative, without bringing together the fights against horizontal and vertical inequalities, those victories will make no real difference on the fabric of Brazilian society.

Before that, though, we must expect to see what the post-Bolsonaro government, paradoxically having that very same Bolsonaro as president, will be able to deliver. After years of mayhem, it may end up implementing a new political reality—one that will be neither Bolsonarian nor progressive, and one that could last for a long time.
The Second Implosion of Latin America
William Robinson
University of California, Santa Barbara

Some three decades after the wars of revolution and counterinsurgency came to an end in Central America, the region is once again on the brink of implosion. The Isthmus has been gripped by renewed mass struggle and state repression, the cracking of fragile political systems, unprecedented corruption, drug violence, and the displacement and forced migration of millions of workers and peasants. The backdrop to this second implosion of Central America, reflecting the spiraling crisis of global capitalism itself, is the exhaustion of a new round of capitalist development in recent years to the same drumbeat as the globalization that took place in the wake of the 1980s upheavals.

Lost in the headlines on Central American refugees fleeing to the United States is both the historical context that has sparked the exodus and the structural transformations through capitalist globalization that has brought the region to where it is today. The mass revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s did manage to dislodge entrenched military-civilian dictatorships and open up political systems to electoral competition, but they were unable to achieve any substantial social justice or democratization of the socioeconomic order.

Capitalist globalization in the Isthmus in the wake of pacification unleashed a new cycle of modernization and accumulation. It transformed the old oligarchic class structures, generated new transnationally oriented elites and capitalists and high-consumption middle classes even as it displaced millions, aggravated poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, and wreaked havoc on the environment, triggering waves of outmigration and new rounds of mass mobilization among those who stayed behind. Hence the very conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place were aggravated by capitalist globalization.

The Central American regimes now face mounting crises of legitimacy, economic stagnation, and the collapse of the social fabric. Despite the illusion of “peace and democracy” so touted by the transnational elite in the wake of pacification, the roots of the regional conflict have persisted: the extreme concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of elite minorities alongside the pauperization and powerlessness of a dispossessed majority. With the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras, the massacre of peaceful protesters in Nicaragua in 2018, and the return of death squads in Guatemala, this
illusion has been definitively shattered. The Central American regimes now face mounting crises of legitimacy, economic stagnation, and the collapse of the social fabric.

The Transnational Model of Capitalist Development

As Central America became swept up into globalization from the 1990s, a new breed of transnationally-oriented capitalists and state elites forged a neoliberal hegemony in consort with Washington and the international financial institutions (IFIs, principally the U.S. Agency for International Development, the IMF, and the World Bank). They imposed privatization, austerity, deregulation of labor markets, new investment regimes to facilitate transnational corporate access to the region’s abundant natural resources and fertile lands, and free trade deals including the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2004.

The transnational model of accumulation involved the introduction of new economic activities that integrated the region into transnational production and service chains, part of the capitalist globalization that has involved a vast expansion of mining operations, agribusiness, tourism, energy extraction, and infrastructure mega-projects throughout Latin America, feeding a voracious global economy and swelling transnational corporate coffers. Like earlier cycles of capitalist development, an expansion of exports and a deeper integration into the world economy resulted in a reactivation of growth and investment in the 1990s and on.

The evolution of Central America’s political economy closely mirrors that of the global economy as a whole. The world economy went through a period of prosperity in the 1960s, then crisis and stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the globalization boom of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. Closely mirroring this evolution, the Isthmus experienced an average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent from 1960-1970, which declined to 3.9 percent from 1970-1980 and then plummeted to just 0.8 percent in the tumultuous 1980-1990 decade. But then, in sync with the global economy, growth recovered, averaging 4.0 percent annually during the globalization boom of 1990-2008.

In the wake of the financial collapse of 2008, Central American growth rates began to decline again.

Globalization as a qualitatively new phase in the ongoing and open-ended evolution of world capitalism has been characterized above all by the rise of a globally integrated production, financial, and service system. In Central America, the transnational model of accumulation that took hold during the boom has involved a vast expansion of maquiladoras producing garments, electronics, and other industrial goods, agro-industrial complexes, mining and raw material extraction, global banking, tourism, and the “retail revolution,”
or the spread of Walmart and other superstores, as I’ve written in my book.

Export processing zones (EPZs), meanwhile, set up since the late 1980s, dot the Central American urban landscape. Some 70 EPZs now employ some 800,000 workers, mostly young women, and have inserted the region inextricably into the Global Factory.

At the same time, the spread of transnational tourist complexes has turned Central America into a global playground. Local Indigenous, Afro-descendant, and mestizo communities have fought displacement, environmental degradation, and the commodification of local cultures by tourist mega-projects such as the Ruta Maya throughout the region, Roatan in Honduras, San Juan del Sur in Nicaragua, Costa del Sol in El Salvador, or Guanacaste province in Costa Rica. Services, commerce, and finance have also become transnationalized. The arrival of the global supermarket has involved the invasion of transnational retail conglomerates such as Walmart and fast food chains, which have displaced thousands of small traders, disrupted local economies, and propagated a global consumer culture and ideology.

Globalization also brought with it a major expansion of transnational agribusiness. In Honduras, local and transnational capitalist interests have snatched up vast tracks of rural farmland from peasant, Afro-descendant, and Indigenous communities and converted them into palm oil plantations. In Guatemala, too, palm oil planted by local suppliers of global agro-industrial giants ADM and Cargill is uprooting a growing number of peasant communities and driving them to migrate abroad. In Nicaragua, peasants displaced by transnational agribusiness have pushed into and colonized what remained of the agricultural frontier, disrupting Indigenous land. Costa Rica is now a major exporter of exotic new products such as figs, dates, and winter fruits and vegetables produced by transnational agribusiness that has displaced peasant producers and pushed them further into the agricultural frontier.

Most devastating to the ecology and livelihood of local communities is a new round of extractive activity. Most devastating to the ecology and livelihood of local communities is a new round of extractive activity, including mining, oil, and gas, along with fishing and forestry, not to mention the mega infrastructural projects such as an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua and the Agua Zarca dam in Honduras. Conflict has shaken the Indigenous highlands in Guatemala anew, as local communities fight a veritable invasion by gold, silver, and other metal mining and fossil fuel interests—in
some cases even facing off death squads—and a renewed colonization of their territory by agribusiness.

Anti-mining activists have faced death threats and assassinations in El Salvador, where 90 percent of surface water is estimated to be polluted by toxic chemicals, heavy metals, and waste matter as a result of mining. These activists won a historic victory in 2017 when the government passed legislation imposing a blanket ban on metal mining. Environmental and community activists fighting the government’s concessions to transnational companies for large-scale gold mining projects in Nicaragua have faced down riot police, as have activists in neighboring Costa Rica protesting gold mining concessions in the north of the country.

**The Façade Cracks: Economic Stagnation, Political Upheaval, and Social Collapse**

The tenuous social order globalization brought about could only be sustained so long as the economy expanded and those displaced managed to migrate North. Yet the resumption of growth since the 1990s has depended on three factors that are now reaching their limits: a sharp rise in the inflow of transnational corporate investment, a steady increase in external debt, and remittances from Central Americans living abroad.

After a decade of capital flight and disinvestment in the 1980s, Central America again became an attractive investment site for transnational capital in the 1990s. Transnational corporate investment jumped from an annual average of $165 million in the 1990s to $631 million from 2000 to 2010, and then to $6.5 billion from 2011 to 2017 (although Costa Rica accounted for 45 percent of this surge), as surplus capital from North America and Asia sought new investment opportunities abroad following the 2008 global financial collapse.

However, disaggregating the latter figure, foreign direct investment actually dropped sharply starting in 2016, to just above $1 billion annually. Along with this inflow of investment capital, the Central American economy has accrued rising levels of foreign debt, jumping from $33 billion in 2005 to $79 billion in 2018 which, at nearly half the region’s combined GDP, is unsustainable.

But above all, the $20 billion in remittances Central American migrants have sent back home has provided an economic lifeline to the regional economy, while outmigration has acted an escape valve containing political crises. Eighteen and 19 percent of El Salvador and Honduras’ GNP, respectively, comes from remittances, and 10% of Guatemala and Nicaragua’s. In fact, remittances accounted for half of all growth in the GDP in these four countries in 2017, and 78 percent for El Salvador. In other words, the region’s economy would collapse without the money Central Americans send home.
Yet the benefits of growth since the 1990s never trickled down to the impoverished majority, with the exception of an expansion of social programs in Nicaragua during the first few years of Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2007, and a few programs that the FMLN government in El Salvador was able to introduce. Now, however, as the global economy sputters toward recession and investment flows decline, there are diminishing opportunities for capitalist expansion in the Isthmus. From the average annual growth rate of four percent from 1990-2008, the regional GDP growth rate dropped to 3.7 percent in 2012, to 3.5 percent in 2017, and an estimated 2.6 percent in 2018.

Globalization and neoliberalism have wreaked havoc on the working and popular classes, leaving them ill-equipped to survive the coming global economic downturn and local stagnation. A staggering 72 percent of workers in the region labor in precarious work arrangements, often in the informal economy, and some seven out of every eight new jobs are precarious. The Central American population has increased from 25 million in 1990 to over 40 million in 2017 but the labor market has been unable to absorb the majority of new entrants, which helps explain the surge in migration abroad, a number that practically doubled from 2000 to 2017, when it reached 4.3 million.

The social crisis is now leading to escalating political conflict and an unprecedented spiral of corruption. Corrupt state elites backed by national private sector associations, the transnational capitalist class, and IFIs have imposed the globalization model. These same elites facilitated the conditions for local and transnational capital to appropriate the region’s resources and labor in exchange for the opportunity to pillage the state. The long list of corruption cases in the region has landed several former presidents in jail and brought charges against dozens of high-level government officials.

In Guatemala, former president Otto Pérez Molina, a retired military officer during a genocide against the country’s Indigenous majority in the 1980s counterinsurgency, was forced to step down in 2015 after mass protests against his government’s widespread corruption, uncovered by the United Nations International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), formed in 2006 to investigate corruption, drug trafficking, and genocide. Pérez Molina was eventually tried and sentenced to prison. Current president
Jimmy Morales, elected after Pérez Molina’s resignation, has dismantled the CICIG, since it brought fraud and money laundering charges against him, his family members, and other high-level officials.

The larger backdrop to political instability in Guatemala is an upsurge of mass mobilization among the country’s poor and largely Indigenous majority and the return of widespread repression and human rights violations, including the reappearance of death squads that terrorized the population for decades prior to the 1996 peace accord that put an end to the four-decade civil war. The CODECA (Campesino Development Committee), the Campesino Committee of the Highlands (CCDA), and other Indigenous, peasant, student, and worker organizations have organized mass resistance around the country, and are calling for a Constituent National Assembly to re-found the republic and develop “an alternative to capitalism.”

In Honduras, several members of the ruling National Party and family members of former president Porfirio Lobo, brought to power by the 2009 coup d’état, and current president, Juan Orlando Hernández, elected for a second term in 2017 in a contest widely believed to be fraudulent, have been implicated in drug trafficking, embezzlement, and other crimes. While the murder of Indigenous leader Berta Cáceres in 2016 grabbed international headlines, dozens of leaders from the country’s burgeoning social movements of Indigenous, students, workers, peasants, and Afro-descendants have been targeted for assassination.

In El Salvador, the courts convicted former president Antonio Saca to 10 years in prison and issued an arrest warrant for former president Mauricio Funes, who took refuge in Nicaragua after being charged with embezzlement. The Attorney General’s office is investigating other high-level officials for corruption, including those from the governing Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which is likely to be voted out of power in elections this February. In Nicaragua, the nepotistic and dictatorial government of president Daniel Ortega, his wife, vice-president Rosario Murillo, and their inner circle, have made pacts with the traditional oligarchy, enriched themselves through plunder of state resources and an alliance with transnational capital, and deployed the army, police, and paramilitary forces to violently repress peasants, workers, students, and social movements opposing its policies.
PEWS Section Election Results

Congratulations to our colleagues who have been elected to serve the section in the following roles:

Council Members
Irene Pang, Simon Fraser University
Samantha Fox, Michigan State University

Student Representative
Daniel Cunha, Binghamton University

Chair-Elect
Jennifer Bickham-Mendez, William & Mary,

Note: In the 2018 PEWS Section election Tanya Golash-Boza and Jennifer Bickham-Mendez tied in the race for Chair-Elect, and Council voted to have them serve subsequently (Golash-Boza 2018-21; Bickham-Mendez 2019-22).

Proposed Bylaws Amendments
Mission Statement #1 (proposed by the Reconciliation Committee) was approved, as were the bylaws changes to allow new initiatives focused on diversity, teaching, and institutional memory. The updated bylaws can be found here: http://www.asapews.org/bylaws.html

PEWS Lineup at 2019 ASA in NYC

Sunday, August 11
10:30am – Fighting Trump’s Deportation Machine in New York City and Connecticut
New York Hilton, Concourse, Concourse B
Organizer: John Talbot, Western Connecticut State University

Regional Spotlight Session: Under the Trump administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has become a deportation machine. Many grassroots groups around the country have taken up the fight against this deportation machine. This session will provide an overview of the situation nationally and highlight the work of two such groups in the greater NYC area, Make the Road New York and Connecticut Shoreline Indivisible.

Monday, August 12
8:30am – The Global South and the Intellectual Lineages of World-Systems Analysis
Sheraton New York, Lower Level, Madison Square
Organizers: Beverly Silver, Johns Hopkins University, and Amy Quark, William & Mary

Latin-American “Buen Vivir/Good Living” and the Social Sciences in the Modern World System - Julien Demelenne, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; Maria Jose Haro Sly, Federal University of Santa Catarina; Eric H. Mielants, Fairfield University
Promoting a (re)encounter: Latin American structuralism, World-Systems Analysis and the Transformation of the Global South - Victor Ramiro Fernández, National University of Litoral

An Option for the Majority? World-Systems Analysis, Rural Reconstruction and Industrious Revolution in China – Shaohua Zhan, Nanyang Technological University


Discussant: Beverly Silver, Johns Hopkins University

2:30pm – South-South Flows in Global Context
Sheraton New York, Lower Level, Murray Hill
Organizers: Jennifer Bair, University of Virginia, and Manjusha Nair, George Mason University

Presider: Kevan Harris, University of California-Los Angeles

A Charter for Economic Decolonization: Mexico, the Third World, and the Contradictions of South-South Cooperation – Christy Thornton, Johns Hopkins University

Counterhegemonic Human Rights and Transformative Peacebuilding amid Capitalism’s Expulsions – Jackie Smith, University of Pittsburgh

Global corporate hierarchy in 22,000 cities: China vs. the world – Ben Leffel, University of California-Irvine

Reexamining China and South-South Relations: Chinese State-Backed and Flexible Private Capitals in the Philippines – Alvin Camba, Johns Hopkins University

Transparent Capital: Indian Textiles, Gold Standards, and the Ethiopian State – Manjusha Nair, George Mason University

4:30pm - PEWS Refereed Roundtables (1 hour)
Sheraton New York, Second Floor, Central Park West
Organizers: Nikhil Deb and Colin Arnold

Table 1: Economy and Inequality in Contemporary Capitalism
Global South’s Agricultural Change: Export-oriented Tea Cultivation in 19th-century China’s Incorporation Process – Sung Hee Ru, Binghamton University

Impact of Transport and Communication Technology on the Division of Labor and Stratification of Small-Scale Societies – Vladimir Greg Borel, University of California Riverside

Low-wage Work in Europe: The Role of Industry and Labor Market Institutions –
Anthony Rainey, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

The impact of the Great Recession on Attitudes toward Foreign Capital Investment – Joonghyun Kwak, Ohio State University

**Table 2: Environmental Disaster, Power, and Conflict**
Presider: Alvin Camba, Johns Hopkins University

A Critical Review of Disaster-Related Finance: From Insurance to Environmental Management and Assessment – Albert S. Fu, Kutztown University

Coppering the Industrial Revolution: History, Materiality and Culture in the Making of an “Ecological Regime” – Daniel de Deus Cunha, Binghamton University

Meat in the World Economy: Global Trends in Meat Production, Consumption, and Trade, 1960-2015 – Bill Winders, Georgia Institute of Technology; Elizabeth Ransom, Pennsylvania State University

Power, Conflict and Environmental Violence: 21st Century Coal Transition in Colombia – Tamra L. Gilbertson, University of Tennessee, Knoxville


**Table 3: Global Dynamics and Local Struggles**

Does Social Death Focus the Mind? Thinking Past Ecological Catastrophe – Richard Hutchinson, Kennesaw State University

Social Class, Social Networks, Reciprocity: Motivations of Chinese Urban Family Gift-Money Transfer – Wei Zhang, post-doc; Shaojie Zhou, Associate Professor; Yingdan Lu, Stanford University

The Structuration of World Society: The Case of the United Nations Global Compact – Shawn Michael Pope, Stanford University; Gili S. Drori, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

**Table 4: Uneven Development, Revolutions, and the Global South**
Presider: Jennifer Bea Rogers-Brown, Long Island University

Post East Asian World Revolutions? – Christopher Chase-Dunn, University of California-Riverside; Manjing Gao, University of California-Riverside; Sandor Nagy, University of California-Riverside

Institutionalism’s Declining Returns: Wolfgang Streeck and the Literature on Contemporary Capitalism – Jonah M. Birch, Appalachian State University

Local Histories, Global Imagination: The Tributary Face in China’s Africa Policy – Mingwei Jin, Binghamton University

The Importance of What Existed Before Sooyáapoo: Nez Perce Influence the Global
Capitalist World-System – Levin Elias Welch, University of California, Riverside

Unearthing the Sources of Global Uneven Development – Roberto Jose Ortiz Ortiz, Binghamton University

5:30pm – PEWS Section Business Meeting (40 minutes)
Sheraton New York, Second Floor, Central Park West

6:30pm to 8:00pm - PEWS Section Joint Reception with Sections on Global and Transnational Sociology, Peace, War & Social Conflict, and Sociology of Development
Sheraton New York, Third Floor, New York Ballroom West

Tuesday, August 13
8:30am – Current Topics in World-Systems Research
Sheraton New York, Lower Level, Sugar Hill
Organizer: Patricio Korzeniewicz, University of Maryland-College Park

Revisiting Culture and Meaning-Making in World-Systems Analysis: A Dialogue with the Cultural Political Economy Approach – Jason Mueller, University of California, Irvine; Steven Edward Schmidt, University of California, Irvine

Global Waves of Social Protest and Labor Unrest, 1850-2016 – Beverly Silver, John Hopkins University; Sahan Savas Karatasli, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Sefika Kumral, William & Mary

Inter-State Competition and Transnational Capitalists Across the North-South Divide: Different Strategies, New Configurations of Power – Amy Quark, William & Mary, Kristen Hopewell, University of Edinburgh, and Elias Alsbergas, William & Mary

Global Free Trade After US Retreat: China and the Prospect of Hybrid Globalization – Ho-Fung Hung, John Hopkins University

Discussant: Manuela Boatca

Member Spotlights and News

PEWS Students On The Market

Jason C. Mueller (muellej1@uci.edu)
PhD Candidate
University of California, Irvine
Department of Sociology

Research Interests: Theories of Globalization and Development; Political Economy; Political Sociology; Social Theory; Natural Resource Extraction; Post-Colonial Africa; Comparative & Historical Methods.

Dissertation Title: “Beyond ‘Predatory States’ and ‘Resource Curses’: Dispossession, State Strategy, and Diamond Extraction in Botswana and Zimbabwe”

Dissertation Abstract: My dissertation examines the relationship between resource extraction, mineral wealth governance, State strategy, and human rights abuses. As a
comparative-historical project, it assesses two regions typically considered to be diametrically opposed in their developmental-state strategies; Botswana, considered the ‘African miracle state,’ and Zimbabwe, considered a corrupt kleptocracy. It then analyzes the following: the state-sanctioned expulsion of the indigenous San ‘Bushman’ (Botswana) and the population of Chiadzwa (Zimbabwe), and their relationship to structural, strategic, and discursive modes of regulation that promote particular elite agendas in the pursuit of diamond extraction. It identifies the precise mechanisms through which diamond extraction does or does not lead to the emergence of new pools of precarious labor, human rights abuses, and the advancement of a development agenda that uses its mineral wealth to benefit the domestic population at large – or a small sector of elites. By embedding these national developmental trajectories within a global framework of analysis, I unveil similar and different state strategies for development and mineral wealth governance, uncovering the chances for positive and/or negative developmental State outcomes in the global South.

Other Research: Recently I have been working on several projects. In a forthcoming paper, to be published in Peace Review, I uncover the political, economic, and ideological factors that have generated protracted conflict in Somalia over the past several decades. I also highlight emergent and often overlapping movements that champion agendas for worker rights, gender equity, youth empowerment, and environmental restoration. I have also worked on several projects pertaining to theory building and expansion in the domains of globalization, culture, and political economy, including; (1) a manuscript bridging the insights of the late Nicos Poulantzas with current theories of globalization and development [forthcoming in Progress in Development Studies]; and, with a colleague at UC-Irvine, (2) a manuscript that puts World-Systems Analysis in dialogue with the Cultural Political Economy approach, creating a holistic framework for studying the interplay between semiotic and material phenomena as it pertains to social movements, populism, and more [forthcoming in Critical Sociology].
Job Announcement

Open Rank Search School for International Studies Simon Fraser University The School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University (Vancouver campus) invites applications for a continuing research faculty position at the level of full professor or associate professor, to begin in July 2020. We are particularly interested in candidates with research that is grounded in one or more regions of the world. Applicants should have a PhD in a social science discipline, with demonstrated excellence in research and teaching. Preference will be given to candidates with a proven record of leadership and program administration.

The School for International Studies is an interdisciplinary unit with research and teaching programs focused on peace and security; international development; human rights and international law; and governance and civil society. The normal teaching load for this full-time position is four courses per year, taught in two of three terms, with the third for research. The successful candidate will be expected to contribute to the leadership and administration of the School.

Simon Fraser University is a leading Canadian public research university (consistently ranked #1 by Maclean’s Magazine for best comprehensive university in Canada). We earn top marks for our world-class social science research, award-winning students and faculty, and new library acquisitions. Applications will be treated in confidence and should include: a letter of application, a statement of research and teaching, and a curriculum vitae. Letters of reference will be requested of applicants who are long-listed for the position. Applications will be reviewed beginning September 1, 2019 until the position is filled. This position is subject to the availability of funding and approval by the Board of Governors.

Materials should be sent in a single pdf file via email to intst@sfu.ca. Questions about the position can be directed to Dr. Tamir Moustafa, at tmoustafa@sfu.ca. All qualified candidates are encouraged to apply; however, Canadian citizens and permanent residents will be given priority. SFU is an equity employer and encourages applications from all qualified individuals including women, persons with disabilities, visible minorities, Indigenous Peoples, people of all sexual orientations and gender identities, and others who may contribute to the further diversification of the university. Under the authority of the University Act personal information that is required by the University for academic appointment competitions will be collected. For further details see: http://www.sfu.ca/vpacademic/Faculty_Openings/Collection_Notice.html.
New Publications from our Membership

New Articles


https://doi.org/10.1177/2329496519825512


New Books


Paul Almeida’s timely work, *Social Movements: The Structure of Collective Mobilization*, offers a new resource for scholars and community members interested in movements by excluded social groups and their fight for social change. Almeida’s work provides important lessons for students, scholars, and activists by discussing how movements emerge and the reasons individuals choose to participate in collective action.

Recent social movement studies have emphasized how threats, or negative conditions, play a fundamental role in mobilization. Even though there are increasing risks for participation, communities continue to mobilize locally and nationally against different types of threats. Almeida’s work brings to the forefront of movement scholarship and activism a precise classification of different forms of threats, including environmental, economic, and repressive threats and their corresponding contributions to popular mobilization. He organizes the text and chapters into some of the main themes or subfields of social movement research, namely, methods, theory, movement emergence, micro-mobilization and individual recruitment, framing, movement outcomes, and movement dynamics in the global South.


The urban condition is today being radically transformed. Urban restructuring is accelerating, new urban spaces are being
consolidated, and new forms of urbanization are crystallizing. In *New Urban Spaces*, Neil Brenner argues that understanding these mutations of urban life requires not only concrete research, but new theories of urbanization. To this end, Brenner proposes an approach that breaks with inherited conceptions of the urban as a bounded settlement unit—the city or the metropolis—and explores the multiscalar constitution and periodic rescaling of the capitalist urban fabric. Drawing on critical geopolitical economy and spatialized approaches to state theory, Brenner offers a paradigmatic account of how rescaling processes are transforming inherited formations of urban space and their variegated consequences for emergent patterns and pathways of urbanization. The book also advances an understanding of critical urban theory as radically revisable: key urban concepts must be continually reinvented in relation to the relentlessly mutating worlds of urbanization they aspire to illuminate.

**Cruit, Michael and Pat Lauderdale.** 2019. *Climate Disruption and the Anthropocene.* Costa Rica: HBI.

The transformations now occurring within the Earth’s climate and ecosystems portend a drastic impact on human survival, and yet most humans are unaware or indifferent, mainly because mainstream cultural outlets ignore the danger or cover it with disinformation. The disruption occurring in Earth’s ecosystem is reflected in a corresponding decline and disruption in social organization, which is exactly what we see during the last century. Human societies are an inextricable part of the ecosystem and as the ecosystem deteriorates, so too does human experience.


Why are people getting fatter in the United States and beyond? Mainstream explanations argue that people simply eat too much “energy-dense” food, while exercising too little. Swapping the chips and sodas for fruits and vegetables and exercising more, the problem would be solved. By contrast, *The Neoliberal Diet* argues that increased obesity does not result merely from individual food and lifestyle choices. Since the 1980s, the neoliberal turn in policy and practice has
promoted trade liberalization, retrenchment of the welfare regime but also continued agricultural subsidies in rich countries. Neoliberal regulation has enabled agribusiness multinationals to thrive based on highly processed foods, loaded with refined flour and sugars—and meat—, which originated in the United States. Drawing on extensive empirical data, Gerardo Otero identifies the socioeconomic and political forces that created this diet, which has been exported around the globe, often at the expense of people.

Otero shows how state-level actions, particularly subsidies for big farms and agribusiness, have ensured the dominance of processed foods and made healthful fresh foods inaccessible for many. Comparing agrifood performance across several nations, including the NAFTA region, and correlating food access with class inequality, Otero convincingly demonstrates the structural character of food production and how inequality shapes individual food choices. Resolving the global obesity crisis, he concludes, lies not in blaming individuals but with states reducing inequality and making healthier food accessible to all.


In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Brazil improved the health and well-being of its populace more than any other large democracy in the world. In Movement-Driven Development, Christopher L. Gibson combines rigorous statistical, fuzzy-set, and case study analysis to argue that this transformation resulted from subnational mobilizations by "sanitarista" activists in the
country’s Sanitarist Movement. This activism permitted Brazil - a country long infamous for its severe inequality, rampant infant mortality, and clientelist politics - to usher in an unprecedented twenty-five-year transformation of its public health institutions and social development outcomes. The book highlights how sanitaristas fostered these outcomes by leveraging local-level democratic offices to gradually but persistently implement primary public health policies that helped materialize the universal right of all Brazilians to health. In explaining why and how this occurred unevenly throughout urban Brazil, the book develops a new theory of movement-driven development that illustrates how locally-rooted activists can advance progressive social change far more than alternative frameworks allow for. In doing so, it shows how in large democracies like Brazil, activists can both deepen the quality of local democracy and improve human development outcomes previously thought be outside the control of civil society.


Cross-border solidarity has captured the interest and imagination of scholars, activists and a range of political actors in such contested areas as the US-Mexico border and Guantanamo Bay. Chandra Russo examines how justice-seeking solidarity drives activist communities contesting US torture, militarism and immigration policies. Based on participant observation, interviews, surveys and hundreds of courtroom statements, Russo develops a new theorization of solidarity in social movement studies.
JWSR Update

Jackie Smith, Editor & Adam Brode, Managing Editor. *Journal of World-Systems Research*

**JWSR now included in leading scholarly databases**

At long last, the Journal of World-Systems Research has just been accepted for inclusion in *Scopus*, which is the abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature run by the leading publishing company, Elsevier. In addition, we’ve been accepted into the *Emerging Sources Citation Index*, which is part of Thomson Reuters’s Web of Science, which includes the Social Science Citation Index. This means that our journal will now be more visible and accessible via the most commonly used academic search engines, and our content will be more easily assessed with the standard metrics used in professional promotions. I hope this will also encourage more scholars to submit their work to JWSR, knowing that their articles will both be widely available to readers around the world and that their institutions will “count” their JWSR publications for tenure and promotion.

The Web of Science especially has dominated the assessment of scholarly impact in the past, and the major industry indexes continue to have substantial influence. Nevertheless, these indexes have systematically excluded open access publications, which threaten the profitability of commercial publishing. Discrimination against peer reviewed scholarship published outside the corporate scholarly publishing industry harms the scientific enterprise by constraining the free flow of information, effectively enclosing the knowledge commons. Our efforts to get JWSR into professionally recognized indexes has revealed just how much influence profit-driven corporations exert on both our profession and on the accessibility of scientific information. The process of applying for inclusion in these indexes is opaque and the inclusion criteria fluid, driven by decisions in corporate boardrooms rather than by scientists. The result of this corporate influence has been growing inequality in access to information, a problem Smith has documented in a previous essay.

**Recent usage statistics for JWSR**

Articles and book reviews from the most recent issue (Volume 25, Issue 1: Winter/Spring 2019) were downloaded 1,914 times in the first month since publication, a 30.5% increase from the number of first-month downloads for the prior issue (Volume 24, Issue 2: Summer/Fall 2018 – 1466 downloads). This is a considerable jump from one issue to the next, and indicates that our efforts to reach more readers have been successful in some measure. One likely contributor to this increased attention is our special symposium on Corporate Power and Local Democracy. The previous increase in first-month downloads, from Volume 24, Issue 1 to Issue 2, was just 9.1%. Articles and book reviews from the Winter/Spring 2019 issue have been downloaded a total of 2,919 times since publication, which is already nearly half the number of total downloads
(6,274) accrued by the previous issue since its publication. During the same period of time (75 days), the previous issue was downloaded 2,419 times, representing a not-to-be-scoffed at increase of 21%. Márton Demeter, author of “The World-Systemic Dynamics of Knowledge Production: The Distribution of Transnational Academic Capital in the Social Sciences” in our recent issue reports: “I am hearing good responses from all around the World[, and] that means JWSR is an extremely well read periodical.”

The JWSR website (jwsr.pitt.edu) received 11,653 main page views in the 75 days since the publication of Volume 25, Issue 1; in the same span of time from the publication of Volume 24, Issue 2, the website received just 6,444 main page views, indicating that web traffic to the journal’s home page has nearly doubled (!) from the publication of one issue to the next, increasing by over 80%.

PlumX Analytics statistics for the latest issue indicate, however, that social media is not being employed to promote the Journal of World-Systems Research as effectively as it might be, which may reflect low levels of author engagement/promotion on those platforms. Leslie C. Gates, Mehmet Deniz’s “Puzzling Politics: A Methodology for Turning World-Systems Analysis Inside Out” stands out with 121 mentions on social media since publication, but only five other pieces from the latest issue have received any mentions on social media at all, and all of these are in the low single digits. We encourage authors and PEWS members to help us promote our content through social media, and we are working to strengthen the journal’s social media presence.

On the whole, however, the fact that web traffic and article downloads are up very significantly in recent months, despite the lack of a coordinated social media campaign on the part of the journal staff is in itself encouraging, since it suggests that there is still enormous potential for growth in our readership and web presence.

Volunteers needed to boost attention to JWSR content (It’s easy!)

As we learn more about the highly competitive scholarly publishing arena, we’re working to help our authors draw attention to their work and to otherwise enhance the ranking of our journal. We need your help to do this. You can help increase JWSR’s readership by including references to relevant works in your own writings and by referring colleagues to the JWSR site and its content.

Another way you can increase the visibility of our content is by including links to JWSR content in the entries of appropriate Wikipedia pages. This can help drive new readers to our journal and increase citations to JWSR authors. This is good for our journal, but more importantly for the field of world-systems research. Our editorial team invites you to help us with our JWSR Wikipedia project. You can do this by directly adding JWSR references to relevant Wikipedia entries (or by engaging your students in projects to do this), or if you don’t want to
edit entries yourself, you can send suggestions of JWSR content links to Wikipedia entries to jwsr@pitt.edu.

To show how important social media and online cross-referencing can be, we looked at JWSR usage statistics, and we found that two chronologically dated articles are getting lots of new attention these days via social media sharing. Val Moghadam’s *Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and Women's Mobilization* and James Fenelon’s *From Peripheral Domination to Internal Colonialism: Socio-Political Change of the Lakota on Standing Rock* have been frequently accessed and shared in recent months, most likely due to the recent mobilizations around the defense of land and water rights and gender conflicts.

**Editorial Search Update: Co-Editors for Book Review Section Announced**

As you know, our efforts to recruit a new editorial team to begin after our editorial term ends this year have been complicated by the withdrawal of our previously approved editorial team. The PEWS Publications Committee has worked hard to reach out to potential new editorial leaders, and we’re finding that some of those best placed to lead our journal are either burdened with other obligations and/or constrained by the lack of institutional commitment of resources to support the hosting of the journal. As good world-systems scholars, we read this experience as a sign of this political moment, which brings growing pressure on all workers and austerity in our institutions. Whatever the reasons, we know that we and our readers around the world need JWSR now more than ever. We continue to work to fill all the positions on the team, and at this point we’re happy to announce that we have succeeded in bringing in a pair of book review editors, Alexandre White at Johns Hopkins University and Isaac Kamola at Trinity College in Connecticut. Isaac and Alexander will bring a diverse array of expertise to this role, and we look forward to hearing from them in JWSR!

We are continuing to talk with potential senior editors and communications/outreach editors, and we welcome inquiries from readers interested in playing a role in the future of our journal. If you are interested in this search, please contact Publications Committee chair Christopher Chase-Dunn at chriscd@ucr.edu.

Get engaged in helping us strengthen JWSR and the Knowledge Commons

We also want to encourage you to continue to think about the JWSR as an outlet for your work. As you should know by now, we’ve been expanding our journal’s reach and improving its accessibility in various scholarly and other indexes. We continue to work with our publishers, who are information scientists, to find new ways to enhance the reach of our journal’s content. In addition, the journal’s platform enables authors to view statistics on the downloads and other uses of their work through the Plum Analytics service. So please send us your work and encourage your colleagues and students to do so as well!
Our section’s *Journal of World-Systems Research* is one of the most established scholarly open access journals. We are proud to be a pioneer in the open access movement, which is one small but critical element of the larger movements working to build a more just and equitable world-system. In previous issues of PEWS News, we’ve reported on the open access movement, and we encourage PEWS Section members to inform themselves about this movement and to engage in work to promote it. Here is a link to resources that can help: [Defending the Knowledge Commons](#).

Thank you to PEWS Section Members for contributing to PEWSNews! Remember to follow us on twitter (@ASAPEWS) and email announcements to us directly at pewsnewsletter@gmail.com. We look forward to hearing from you!

Marilyn, Jesse, and Zeinab.