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SPECIAL GUEST EDITED SYMPOSIUM: East Asia in the Long Duree or perhaps Longue Durée
Guest Editor: Ho-fung Hung

The emergence of East Asia as a new epicenter of capital accumulation and the most dynamic growth pole in the world economy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century has triggered a revisionist scholarship on East Asia’s early modern history. Now few would disagree that East Asia was a major center of the early modern global economy, rivaling Western Europe. But what is the relationship between East Asia’s centrality in early modern times and its contemporary resurgence? How have interstate conflicts, technology, gender relations, and other socio-political forces, shaped East Asian patterns of accumulation and development? The Resurgence of East Asia, edited by Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden (Routledge 2003), addresses these questions by looking into the region as a historical system over the longue duree. In this symposium, three historical sociologists/geographer critique or perhaps critically assess the volume. These thought-provoking reviews and Arrighi's rejoinder extend and deepen the debate about the past, present, and future of East Asia and the modern world-system.

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Explaining the Resurgence of East Asia

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The Resurgence of East Asia is a remarkable collection of essays distinguished by its vision and breadth of analysis. The editors’ many years of labors apparently have been handsomely rewarded. The volume, as laid out in the introduction, has two primary analytical axes, namely the three temporalities (the so-called 500, 150, and 50 year perspectives) of East Asian development and the insistence on understanding East Asia as a world region: “groups of contiguous countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of dimensions that vary in space and evolve over time.” (p.5) The ensuing essays demonstrate vividly how these two analytical lenses could be fruitfully applied in the analysis of the dynamics of the region.

The book is strongest in the historical accounts of the region in the early modern period. Kenneth Pomeranz’s essay is a sweeping account of the nature between women’s work and economic development in East Asia. As the other historical chapters in the volume, its discussion is guided by both historical and
contemporary concerns. Historically he seeks to spell some implications of the thesis he advanced elsewhere regarding the East-West divergence, namely, the movement in modern Europe towards more resource-intensive and labor-saving path of development. On the other hand, the paper also provides a historical backdrop to understanding of female labor participation in the export-oriented industries in contemporary East Asia.

Hamilton and Chang’s chapter is another tour de force that unpacks the organizational structure of the pre-modern economy in China. It cleverly applies the institutionalist approach in organization studies and Gereffi’s idea of buyer-driven global commodity chain into the study of textile production and distribution in late imperial China. None of the historiography in the chapter is new, but put together the chapter casts the central features of the late imperial economy in refreshing light. They also attempt to extrapolate their thesis from the “traditional” era to the post-Second World War era in which decentralized networks of family firms generate dynamic economic growth by plugging into the global commodity chain of labor-intensive consumer products, much like they find in the organizational structure of the commodity production and commerce in late imperial China.

These two chapters, together with Sugihara’s, formed the backbone of Arrighi et al’s thesis in their interpretive conclusion “that the nineteenth-century ‘great divergence’ between the economic and political fortunes of Europe and East Asia cannot be traced to a prior technical and organizational edge of European institutions vis-a-vis their East Asian counterparts.” (p. 260, emphasis original) The apparent comparability of the levels of economic development, in commercialization, agricultural productivity, sophistication of manufactures and per capita income, prior to the nineteenth century in Europe and East Asia then motivates what they regarded as the two puzzles in their analysis of East-West relations over the past 500 years. “The first concerns the extraordinary geographical expansion of the European system of states” while the second one “concerns the extraordinary vitality of the East Asian region in the 150 years since its subordinate incorporation in the European- and later North American-centered global economy.” (p.259)

Their answer to these two puzzles, very briefly focuses on “the role of inter-state relations within and between the two world regions” and “the role of capitalism in shaping regional and global processes.” (p.262) Various chapters in the volume, echoing Wallerstein’s account of the rise of the European modern world-system, have spelled out the view that inter-state relations are important component of the macro-dynamics of the regional systems. The distinguishing feature between European states and East Asian states is “the intense competition that set European states against one another and recurrently led to the displacement of one state by another in the role of regional leader.” In contrast, “the China-centered tributary system frequently provided a basis for mediating inter-state relations and articulating hierarchies and minimal resource to war”. (p.262) Sugihara highlights the significance of this point succinctly: “What was crucially missing in the region was the strong ‘big’ government of the nation-state in pursuit of territorial purpose and ready to promote big business and investment in fixed capital. Without such initiatives, there was no chance to develop the navigation and military technology, which in Europe prepared a scientific and an industrial revolution” (p. 93) Arrighi, Hung, Hung and Selden use the cases of the expeditions led by Zheng He in the sixteenth century and the commercial empire built by Zheng family as exceptions that prove the rule of the absence of the impetus towards the development of “developmental” states and state-sponsored capitalistic endeavors. In the case of Zheng He, the logic of the tributary system was such that the military expeditions did not create self-sustaining dynamics that supported further expansion. For the Chinese empire, “the economic benefits of expansions fell far short of what would have been required to sustain the costs of an armament race, European-style.” (p.283) The
Zheng family in Taiwan, on the other hand, built the commercial empire largely to support its dynastic struggle against the Qing. The military defeat of Zheng and the reunification of Taiwan under Qing thus effectively stamped out the capitalistic impulses. Without overseas territorial and commercial expansion, the economic dynamics in East Asia centered on the national economy and deepening division of labor between different regions within the national boundary. Short-distance trade between different micro-regions expanded much faster than long-distance trade between the different macro-regions or even between national economies.

Effectively the volume presents an alternative view of the temporary eclipse of East Asia in the nineteenth century that centers squarely on the role of the state in pushing for territorial expansion and in doing so intentionally or unintentionally fostering commercial enterprises and technological advancements. Without the developmental state, whatever socio-economic advantages East Asia, China in particular, enjoyed since the medieval time did not culminate in the kind of capitalism that developed in the West. The volume and especially the editors stick to a conception of capitalism proposed by Braudel that distinguish between the “market economy” and genuine “capitalism”. In a three-layered structure of the world economy, “market economy” consists of “regular participants in buying and selling activities whose rewards are more or less proportionate to the costs and risks involved in these activities.” “Capitalism”, on the other hand, sits at the top of the world economy and “consists of those participants in trade who systematically appropriate the largest profits, regardless of the particular nature of the activities (financial, commercial, industrial or agricultural) in which they are involved.” (p.263) In their view, by the early modern period East Asia had a well developed market economy but it did not blossom into capitalism, largely because the absence for territorial expansion and the concomitant state-led mercantilist impetus. In their own words, “the intense political-military competition that from the start set European states against one another was an essential ingredient in the enlarged reproduction of the (Braudelian) capitalist dynamic that recurrently engendered an ever growing surplus of capital within the European regional system…. Directly and indirectly, this self-reinforcing cycle of capital accumulation and territorial expansion was the main driving force of those technological and organizational innovations that eventually moved the European system to dominion globally.” (p.265)

This is quite a pervasive argument that capitalizing on a number of new historical scholarship on the subject. There are two remaining concerns, however, that need to be addressed for it to become a full-fledged reinterpretation of the East Asian experience. The first concerns the conception of capitalism and its dynamics as adopted in the volume. The initial reaction I had upon reading the concluding essay was that it reminded me of the criticisms made by Robert Brenner (1977) on the radical theories of development expounded by Frank and Wallerstein. Although they have tried to differentiate the “Braudelian capitalist dynamics” they adopt from the “Smithian market dynamic” and sought to equate it with Marx’s general formula of capital, anyone who are familiar with exchanges between the dependency perspectives and their Marxist critics in the 1970s would recognize how similar their conception of capitalism from the Smithian views of capitalism as exposed by the radical development theorists. While this is not the place to repeat the discussions (this is exactly what happened in his (Brenner and Isett 2002) recent critique of Pomeranz’s (2000) book), for Brenner the crucial difference between the Smithian conception of capitalism and the Marxist conception is the latter’s location of its dynamics in the production instead of the exchange spheres. It is the modes of production and appropriation of surplus that mark one mode of production from another. In capitalism, it is its distinctive relations of production that generate the inherent dynamism in capitalism, whereas in previous modes the relations of production had prevented the maximization of surplus generation and appropriation. It is also the reason why many Marxists have been unable to accept Frank
and Wallerstein’s interpretations of the rise of the Europe; for them the radical development theorists have placed too much emphasis on territorial expansion and the availability of new markets and sources of exploitation in the New World. Arrighi et al.’s argument is not exactly the same as the version of radical development theories thrashed by Brenner, but they are remarkably close. As Frank, they think territorial expansion and new markets generated the dynamics towards continuous profit maximization and capital accumulation, but they do recast it with does of geo-politics and state-led mercantilism. Hamilton and Chang’s insistence that the organization of production in premodern China was similar to contemporary buyer-driven commodity chain and Arrighi et al.’s observation that technical and organizational differences cannot account for the East-West divergence does carry with it traces of the Smithian capitalism. How would they, then, react to Brenner’s criticisms? Were there any salient differences in relations of production that could produce the differences? Or do they really think that the classic Marxist notions are no longer useful for the problematic at their hands?

The other observation I want to make concerning the volume is that while it purports to explain the resurgence of East Asia, the bulk of it is historical and only scanty attention has been paid in the concluding chapter and a few other chapters. In most cases, the contemporary East Asia is treated more or less as an afterthought rather than a direct and full-fledged extrapolation of their historical argument to the contemporary era. Arrighi et al.’s account of the East Asian economic renaissance relies a long on Arrighi’s earlier papers on the region but much of it is descriptive in nature and the only place where an attempt to extrapolate their novel argument on the East-West divergence to the twentieth century is the section on “Lineages of the East Asian economic renaissance” (p. 309). The “three-stage rocket” model is useful as a descriptive concept but it does not tell us too much about the resurgence of Japan and later China any more than they played key roles in reviving the tribute-trade system in a modern form. The most interesting point is actually made in the conclusion of the chapter when they compare the US-centered system to the China-centered tribute-trade system in the premodern era. This is close to the theory of hegemonic stability in international relations studies but the historical analogy does create the conceptual space to extend their historical analysis to the contemporary era. What, then, is in the dynamics of the US-centered system that contributed to the resurgence of East Asia? Unfortunately, we still have to wait for a more detailed delineation.

As many edited volumes, there are inconsistencies among the essays. Sugihara’s chapter, for example, contrasts Europe’s “industrial revolution” with East Asia’s “industrious revolution”. In the next chapter, however, Pomeranz cites approvingly of Jan De Vries’s argument about the “industrious revolution” in Northwestern Europe (p. 132). Although the two authors use the term in similar way and the two points may not be contradictory to each other if Europe and East Asia were actually quite similar in the Middle Ages and started to diverge in the modern period. Yet at the end this is not very clear from what is written.

In this volume the authors have successfully recasted the conceptual tools in development theories in the East Asian context and incorporate the latest historical scholarship in their discussion. It will be valuable for anyone interested to look at the East Asian region beyond the conventional wisdoms and will certainly become a standard reference in future discussions of the East Asian region.

References

Getting China Right: East Asia in World History

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Getting China Right: East Asia in World History

Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden are to be thanked and praised for this collection, which not only offers some of the best recent studies of the East Asian economy in both the late Imperial and modern periods, but also places that economy in a broader global and world-historical context.

By a ‘global’ context, I mean that the authors of the chapters study the functioning of the East Asian economy in its constituent parts (China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia); they further study the relations among those parts, and they study the relations between East Asia and the wider world including India, Russia, the United States, and Europe. By a ‘world-historical context,’ I mean the authors relate economic change in East Asia to the dynamics of global development and change over the past two centuries, from Chinese dominance of the world economy to European imperialism to Chinese Communism and to the industrialization and wealth creation of Japan and the NICs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). To do all these things in one volume is an amazing achievement. This is the exceptional edited volume whose sum is more than the value of its parts.

The book will serve as a tonic and stimulant (and if necessary, an antidote) to those who still view the East Asian economy prior to the late 19th or early 20th century as dominated by impoverished, barely self-supporting peasant households whose tribute, taxes, and rents supported a mainly idle elite of amateur artist/poet/scholars and officials. This book makes clear the huge volume of commercial and manufacturing activity that occurred in China and Japan by the 17th and 18th centuries, involving a remarkable range of consumer goods and involving the majority of rural and urban households as both producers and consumers of manufactured products. In addition, as the chapter by Hamashita makes clear, China was also involved in a rich and complex system of overseas trade with other regions in East Asia that continued even well after Europe’s incursions in the 19th century.

The book will also serve to correct the view of China as a monolithic polity, standing unchallenged in its domain until the entry of European imperialists in the 1800s. In fact, as Peter Perdue’s marvelous chapter on China’s frontiers makes clear, China was always in competition and conflict with other Asian states, and often on the losing end. From the overthrow of the Northern Song, to the victory of the Mongols, to the
conquest by the Manchus, “China” was frequently overrun by non-Chinese, and whoever ruled China was almost always in a stance of war against technically equal or sometimes superior inner Asian and northern Asian forces. Even what was “Chinese” was open to contention, as the Manchus retained their distinctive language and culture even after centuries of ruling China.

Various chapters bring the details of the Chinese and East Asian trade and manufacturing networks into sharp focus, discussing everything from the merchant networks of late imperial China to Japanese absorption of technology and innovation in the 19th and 20th centuries.

For example, scholars of 18th century England such as John Brewer and Roy Porter (1993) have attributed England’s industrial revolution to the rising demand for diversified consumer goods, which created national markets and regional manufacturing specialties, such as Staffordshire pottery, Shetland woolens, Irish linens, Sheffield cutlery, Birmingham metal goods, and Lancashire cottons. Yet what are we to think when we read Hamilton and Chang’s account in Chapter 5 of how “Shaoxing wine, Jiangzhou tea, Luchou silk piece goods, Xiangxin (Hunan embroidery), Yuexiu (Guangdong embroidery), Suxiu (Sichuan embroidery), Suxiu (Suzhou embroidery), Shujin, (Sichuan cotton cloth), Huizhou ink stones and brushes, Fuzhou paper, Suzhou New Year prints, Yixing teapots and cups, and Jingdezhen porcelains … were widely available in most large urban centers, and in the richer regions of China many could be found even in small markets” (p. 191)? Nor were these simple area designations, but as with England, they were more like brand names, designating a specific style and technique of manufacturing and production regulated by networks of merchants who specified goods to be produced according to markets driven by consumer taste. If consumer demand is what drove industrialization in the West, how could China sustain such sophisticated national consumer and production markets for centuries without advancing to industrialization?

Sugihara (Chapter 3) makes a similar case for Japan, showing how an ‘industrious revolution’ had produced a wide range of consumer-oriented manufactures in rural areas for both urban markets and local consumption, and generated rising living standards from the early18th century.

Hamilton and Chang (pp. 199-200) also point out that Chinese manufacturing did not simply fall into a swoon at the onset of western manufactured imports. In fact, quite the reverse. While machine-spun cotton fibers (imported mainly from India and Japan, then created in China from European and Japanese-owned mills) displaced local spinning, manufactured textiles from Britain did not displace Chinese-manufactured cloth. In fact, the availability of machine-spun thread led to a boom in Chinese cloth production, such that exports of Chinese-made cloth rose almost tenfold from the 1870s to the 1920s, and included exports of bolts of Chinese cotton to Britain! Drawing on traditional skills, and recognizing that the production of textiles was not merely a matter of machines weaving threads into cloth, but involved the selection of various types of thread, the dying of thread and design of intricate patterns, and various levels of quality in construction and finishes, Chinese textile producers found niches from common local cloths to export luxury and decorated silks and cottons into the twentieth century. In other words, Chinese capitalists managed to beat Europeans at their own game well into the early 1900s.

China thus had a rich and dynamic political and economic system throughout imperial times. Korea and Japan too had their own impetus and development. Why then were European states able to subordinate and surpass East Asia economically by the late 19th and through most of the 20th century?

Here the authors of the volume start to differ. At various times, the answer offered is power: “China had
no answer to the steam-powered warship that in a single day in February 1841 destroyed nine war junks, five forts, two military stations, and one shore battery” (Arrighi, Hui, Hung and Selden, Chapter 7, p. 293). At other times the answer is imperialism: “In sum, the nineteenth-century global UK-centered capitalist system rested from beginning to end on tribute from India. It was tribute from India that made possible the sixfold increase in British public expenditure that in 1792-1815 laid the foundation of British supremacy in the capital goods industries over the next half-century” (same authors, p. 290). At other times, the answer is the “self-reinforcing cycle of capital accumulation and territorial expansion [that] was the main driving force of those technological innovations … that eventually moved the European system to dominion globally.”

To go backward through these views, it seems that a ‘cycle of capital accumulation and territorial expansion’ cannot explain European dominance, as China’s own history from 1600 to 1800, as this volume shows, was precisely one of capital accumulation and territorial expansion. In these centuries, the area ruled by China’s leaders expanded its territory to the north into Manchuria, to the west into central Asia, to the southwest into Tibet, and into the south past the Pearl River delta down to Vietnam. China also became the greatest sink for mobile capital in the world, as ships built for the China trade carried ton after ton of silver into China from Japan, from Europe, and from the Americas directly via Manila. If Europe differed from Asia in this period, it must be what Europeans did with their territory and capital, not the mere possession of it, that mattered most.

This leads to imperialism – did Indian tribute power the British juggernaut? The figures given in this book echo the conclusions already established by Patrick O’Brien (1988), that British imperialism didn’t pay enough to balance Britain’s books. Arrighi, Hui, Hung, and Seldon cite contemporary accounts that in 1815, the British East India company did “pour an abundant revenue into the British Exchequer and benefit the nation to an extent of £6 million yearly” (p. 292). This sounds impressive, except that six pages earlier, these authors tell us that from 1792 to 1815 Britain’s public expenditure rose from £22 to £123 million; the contribution of the East India Company thus paid less than five percent of public expenditure. Of course, on an annual basis, what mattered was not so much total spending as the interest on the accumulated debt, which was the basis for the government’s annual expenditure. But even here the authors note that in 1815, the annual interest on Britain’s public debt was £30 million; thus the India tribute was no more than twenty percent of the annual interest payment on the debt; eighty percent came from other (mainly domestic) sources.

This leaves steam-power and technology, and that does appear to be where Britain had its peculiar triumph. But even here we should note that there was not just one way, the British way, to advance. The chapters by Pomeranz and Sugihara show that careful family allocation of labor allowed China and Japan to achieve much of the efficiency in manufacturing that British achieved simply by herding workers into factories. Nonetheless, most of the material in this volume on economic development follows the prevalent practice of simply emphasizing capital accumulation and expansion of production, as if Smithian growth naturally and inevitably produced modern Schumpeterian growth, with its cooperation between rapid-discovery science, scientific engineering, and product and process innovation. I have argued elsewhere that we will never understand the divergence between European and non-European economic development in the 19th century without careful attention to the role of science and technology in transforming the energy-basis and the development of manufacturing processes in Europe (Goldstone 2002). Katzenstein is the main author who gives a key role to technological advance, showing how the Japanese success after World War II depended on skillful acquisition, deployment, and innovation of production technologies.
Finally, this volume suggests that European economic domination may have been temporary. China was the largest economy in the world for several hundred years prior to 1800, and is likely to resume that position before the end of the twenty-first century. The remarkable catch-up in per-capita GDP by Japan and Korea in the second half of the twentieth century is laid out here as the result of diverse but effective strategies to mobilize labor, adapt capital, and integrate into global markets. There seems nothing barring China (and India) from doing the same, provided their political systems choose to do so. If that is the case, the “resurgence of East Asia” will indeed take wing and books written two or three hundred years from now may instead be pondering the ‘temporary upsurge’ of European global dominance as a remarkable but transient phenomenon.

References


Metabolic Rifts, East and West? Socio-Ecological Crises, from the Rise of the West to the Resurgence of East Asia

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In *The Resurgence of East Asia*, Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden have assembled a breathtaking collection of papers that explains resurgent economic vitality of this “world-region” in late capitalism. This volume is full of stimulating essays that deserve to be read closely and discussed widely. For this discussion, I would like to focus on what I see as the book’s pivotal essay, “Historical Capitalism, East and West.”

Rather than challenge the particulars of what is in many respects an enormously persuasive account, I would like to engage its underlying conception of historical capitalism. In (alas!) extremely broad strokes, I contend that the ambitious task of identifying and explaining patterns of convergence and divergence between East and West over the past five centuries is fettered by a conception of historical capitalism that externalizes socio-ecological relations. This is, then, not a quarrel over the appropriate angle of vision but rather over the nature of the optic itself. In place of a conception of historical capitalism limited to the social moments of competition, conflict, and innovation, I suggest an alternative optic that sees the intertwining of ecological and social process throughout modernity’s leading patterns of recurrence and evolution: state formation, inter-state competition, social revolutions, colonial expansion, and yes, even financialization! I take as my starting point the notion of “metabolic rift,” signifying multi-layered ruptures
in nutrient cycling between town and country. While characteristic of all civilizations, the metabolic rift achieves dramatic expression in the modern world. From this standpoint, capitalism is not so much a social system existing in a physical environment as a unique crystallization of socio-ecological relations.

For Arrighi, Po-Keung Hui, Ho-fung Hung, and Mark Selden “historical capitalism” signifies something quite different from Wallerstein’s widely-read formulation. If both elaborations emphasize the centrality of endless accumulation as the sine qua non of capitalism, Arrighi and his collaborators emphasize a narrower conceptual frame. For Wallerstein historical capitalism turns on the relentless commodification of land and labor. It is in this broad sense a mode of production. In contrast, for Arrighi capitalism is first and foremost a mode of accumulation. This conception, first, privileges innovations by systemic agencies (states and firms) rather than anti-systemic agencies; and second, posits no necessary contradiction between socio-ecological transformation and capital accumulation. In this formulation, capital’s ability to capture and effect high-profit lines owes everything to “its unlimited flexibility, its capacity for change and adaptation” (Braudel, 1982:433). Such flexibility enables the endless accumulation of capital and constitutes its defining social feature. The commodification of land and labor is implicated in but not dialectically bound to capital’s self-expansion. Delinking ecological productions and particularities from capital accumulation, this Braudelien-inspired historical sociology embraces a nature-society dialectic at the level of markets and material life only to reject it at the level of capitalism.

Among its consequences, the authors of “Historical Capitalism” identify medieval China’s agro-ecological revolution – centering on high-yielding, multi-cropped wet rice – as a major ingredient in the era’s long expansion and southeastern China’s “commercial revolution” especially. The “main tendencies” of “capitalist transformation” that ensued, however, are not then related to its enabling agro-ecological transformations. Agro-ecological revolution appears on the scene, does its work, and disappears. But this “big bang” treatment of China’s socio-ecological relations over the past 500 years may not be fruitful. By the middle ages, China was home to the planet’s most “thoroughly anthropogenic” landscapes (McNeill, 1998:37). Nor was it simply a matter of degree; the form of agro-ecological transformation mattered also. Of special importance, China’s medieval wet rice revolution may have reinforced a longstanding orientation of the part of the imperial state towards what I would call an internal ecological fix.

Why this might be so concerns the political ecology of wet rice in medieval China. While all premodern civilizations were to some extent held together by states that regulated and transformed their physical environments, in China the state was active to a much greater degree, on a larger scale, and for a longer period of time than anywhere else. In contrast to wheat – a crop that “devours the soil and forces it to rest regularly” (Braudel, 1977:11) – the new riziculture was not only more productive but more sustainable. The catch? Higher productivity and a certain degree of insurance against annual rainfall variations were achieved at the cost of what Elvin calls “premodern technological ‘lock-in’” (1993:12). If this system was to work, river ecologies, dams, irrigation works, and canal systems would need to be regulated adequately, a condition that favored the emergence of an expansive imperial authority. No other civilization “locked itself into a situation demanding constant intensive maintenance to prevent sharp ecological degradation” (McNeill, 1998:37). This situation favored, in contrast to medieval Europe, a distinctive mode of crisis-response: China’s ruling strata could orient towards the state as a means of resolving systemwide agrarian contractions by retooling the ecological infrastructure.

How does this relate to the political ecology of rice relative to wheat? The latter were home to “independent-minded agricultural communities” that continually frustrated territorial consolidation, in Asia and Europe both. Rice’s hydraulic infrastructure, in contrast, placed the “terrible weapon of mass starvation in the hands” of empire-builders. But it also demanded a huge “collective effort” that empowered villages and compelled states to consider their welfare. Divergent tendencies in territorial formation were
complemented by divergence at the point of production. It seems that rice favored large-scale territorial power but undermined the possibilities for landowners to take over production. Relative to wheat, irrigated rizicultures privileged the “the skill of the cultivators” over the “increasingly complex instruments of production,” maximizing labor inputs and “impos[ing] severe” barriers to an agricultural revolution along northwestern European lines (Palat, 1995:56-57, 70).

What does this agronomic variation suggest for social-reductionist conceptions of historical capitalism, and the divergent trajectories of East and West? Above all, these civilizational political ecologies conditioned distinctive epochal responses to the Afro-Eurasian-wide contraction of the long 14th century. If China and Europe both experienced sharp demographic decline, agrarian unrest, and political crises, the socio-ecological contours of the downturn and its subsequent resolution were starkly different.

In Europe, the long 14th century began with an agrarian contraction that turned quickly to crisis. Arrighi and his coauthors rightly identify the era’s escalating interstate conflict and point convincingly to its articulation with rising demand for mobile capital and corresponding pressure for global expansion. But this territorial power-capital accumulation dialectic was but one moment of a broader systemwide crisis. By 1300, agricultural yields and with them seigneurial revenues had began to fall, and fall hard. The states were going to war and competing for mobile capital precisely because the agrarian crisis constrained their ability to extract revenues internally. An internal ecological fix was beyond their reach.

Europe’s emerging crisis turned on a civilizational political ecology that was land-extensive rather than labor-intensive, and one not well-suited to centralized fixes. Wheat, and the livestock that went with it, devoured the land in medieval Europe. Over time the soil was progressively exhausted, and new settlement failed to make up the deficit. Far from a Malthusian contradiction, it was feudal agriculture’s basic class relations that undermined its ecological basis, even as it empowered the peasantry. Based on the political extraction of surplus, yet recognizing the peasant’s customary rights, feudalism provided neither the coercion nor the incentive necessary to ensure rising productivity. Productivity gains, moreover, tended to be undermined by feudal exactions. Moves towards agricultural improvement tended to hit an upper ceiling dictated by seigneurial hegemony. In feudalism’s version of a “simple reproduction squeeze” (Watts, 1983), the peasant was forced into farming for survival in a way that essentially mined the soil, but was under no compulsion to attenuate soil exhaustion to maximize productivity. The upshot was a socio-ecological system in which the lord-peasant relation enforced a long-run shift from pasture to arable under the pressure of demographic expansion, which reduced the livestock necessary to replenish soil fertility, which called forth new colonization efforts, and thence to renewed ecological overdraft. A vicious circle indeed!

All of which set the stage for the return of generalized famine after 1300. Combined with recurrent epidemiological shocks detonated by the Black Death (1347-51), the ensuing demographic collapse struck at the very heart of feudal class power: the relatively high labor-land ratio that reinforced the system’s coercive- and labor-intensive accumulation strategy. A third of the population gone, the labor-land ratio declined sharply, effectively eliminating the functional equivalent of feudalism’s reserve army of labor. The peasantry’s bargaining power – especially in western Europe – was correspondingly enhanced, reinforcing the ongoing contraction of seigneurial revenues. Moreover, feudalism’s earlier wave of state-formation and commercialization had created new solidarities of resistance among the peasantry, whose rising power ensured that depression turned to crisis for Europe’s ruling strata. These strata, to be sure, employed all manner of coercive measures in the interests of feudal restoration. But to no avail. Failing to win by means of an internal fix, Europe’s ruling strata – the states, the seigneurs, the merchants – sought to recoup their losses by means of an external ecological fix, overseas expansion.

Europe did not invent overseas expansion, and as we all know China launched a series of maritime adventures roughly coterminous with Europe’s. That Europe embarked on global conquest and China did
not has something to do with uneven nature of the medieval socio-ecological crisis. Put simply, Europe’s was a crisis of the system while China’s was a crisis in the system. In one world-region the apparatus of tributary domination would begin to crack and then shatter; in the other it would remain intact for several centuries. China – because it had achieved perhaps the world’s “greatest ecological complementarity” (McNeill, 1998:34-5) – was at once relatively less crisis-prone than medieval Europe’s, and relatively more amenable to internal fixes. In the long 14th century, for all the agrarian unrest and political crisis, the Chinese state was able to “restore agriculture” and re-establish “the essential portion of the state’s resources” on the basis of agrarian rather than commercial taxation (Gernet, 1982:390-391).

This was precisely what could not be achieved in late medieval Europe. Agrarian relations could not be restructured from above in a way that leant itself to feudal restoration. Overseas expansion, in contrast, held forth the possibility of expanding the economic surplus, and thereby resolving the core of the feudal crisis by sidestepping a restive peasantry. But plunder and mercantile redistribution would not suffice to expand the surplus. Socio-ecological transformation would need to displace redistribution.

Enter the commodity frontier. Afro-Eurasia’s civilizations had long effected a variety of regional socio-ecological crises. All deployed some form of resource frontier expansionism as a means of attenuating these. By the mid-15th century, however, faced with an empowered peasantry and a socio-ecological order in disarray, Europe’s leading strata began to pursue a new civilizational strategy. Commodity production and exchange, a longstanding aspect of civilizational expansion, was fast becoming an end unto itself. Commodity frontiers increasingly supplanted resource frontiers. Where medieval expansion had been essentially redistributive, the new commodity frontiers were profoundly transformative. Merchants’ profits and state-seigneurial revenues were, above all through the agency of the sugar plantation and the silver mining complex, re-established on a new world-historical foundation, the endless commodification of land and labor.

The rise of capitalism signaled a quantum leap forward in the scale, scope, and speed of ecological degradation. The ancient antagonism between town and country was now elevated into a dialectic of globalizing ecological conquest and then crisis. This “metabolic rift,” whereby ecological wealth moved from country to city in progressively unsustainable fashion, at once expressed and enabled a new web of socio-ecological relations. Global expansion rather than regional-territorial accretion became the first, best response to socio-ecological problems. Thus emerged a specifically modern pattern of “sequential overexploitation” (Gadgil & Guha, 1992): relative socio-ecological exhaustion in one region after another was followed by recurrent waves of geographical expansion aimed at securing fresh supplies of labor and land, and thence to renewed and extended cycles of unsustainable development. For the first time, the globalization of ecological crisis was inscribed in a civilization’s laws of motion.

Precisely how we might go about incorporating the production of nature into large-scale comparative inquiries is among the world-historical perspectives’ greatest challenges. For Arrighi and his coauthors, ecological factors exist, but only at the margins. When they rightly insist that command over “natural and energy resources” merits consideration alongside command over “financial resources,” what counts are the social relations of the latter, operating independently from the former. In this maneuver, the authors effectively containerize these two moments of accumulation, reproducing a notion of history that unduly privileges the impress of “society” on the “environment.” In so doing, they instanciate a more general tendency, a social impact-environmental consequence approach. Constituting nature and society as internally homogenous and ontologically prior to the socio-ecological whole, this approach tends to reduce human and extra-human nature to the status of raw material, whose only real power is found in the exhaustion of allegedly natural limits.

An alternative conception – what I am calling a dialectical-feedback perspective – rejects this nature-society dualism. Starting with the idea of metabolic rift as embodying ecological and social relations
simultaneously, we might begin to situate ecological contradictions within capitalism’s broader spatial and productive relations. From this standpoint, the town-country antagonism, for instance, becomes an enduring socio-ecological relation of the modern world, its contradictions manifesting an unsustainable movement of ecological wealth from country to city. Thus environmental transformations are not simply consequences of capitalist development; they are in equal measure constitutive of such development, condition as well as consequence. The peculiarity of this modern antagonism suggests a rocky road for East Asia’s resurgence, and the future of humanity along with it.

References


The Resurgence of East Asia: A Rejoinder

Giovanni Arrighi

Stephen Chiu’s, Jack Goldstone’s, and Jason Moore’s commentaries on *The Resurgence of East Asia* raise important issues. Some call for simple clarifications. Others call for different research agendas than the one pursued in the book. In this rejoinder, I will clarify what I can and specify the lines of inquiry that seem to
me most promising in overcoming the limits of Resurgence.

I shall begin with Goldstone’s observations concerning our explanations of the late nineteenth century eclipse of East Asia by Western economic achievements. Goldstone presents technological advances, tribute from India, and what we call “a self-reinforcing cycle of capital accumulation and territorial expansion” as alternative explanations of the East Asian eclipse. He dismisses tribute from India on the grounds that it was far less significant than domestic sources in servicing Britain’s accumulated national debt. He dismisses the self-reinforcing cycle of capital accumulation and territorial expansion on the grounds that it characterized also the Chinese experience in the critical 1600-1800 period. And while favoring the technological explanation, he criticizes most of the material on economic development in Resurgence for “simply emphasizing capital accumulation and expansion of production, as if Smithian growth naturally and inevitably produced modern Schumpeterian growth, with its cooperation between rapid discovery science, scientific engineering, and product and process innovation.”

I find this criticism surprising, because the premise of most of the material on economic development in Resurgence is that Smithian growth does not in itself produce the kind of technological innovations that have characterized successive Western “industrial revolutions.” Rather, it tends to taper off into a high-level equilibrium trap. One of the key puzzles we set out to solve is precisely how and why England/West Europe managed to escape this trap, while China/East Asia did not.

I have no disagreement with Goldstone’s contention that in order to understand this difference we must pay careful attention to the role of science and technology in transforming the energy-basis of production in Europe. The disagreement concerns the origins of this transformation. In as far as I can tell, Goldstone conceives of the transformation as an historical contingency, largely unrelated to previous developments. In the concluding chapter of Resurgence, in contrast, we trace the rupture to a long-standing European pattern of war-making, state-making, and money–making. This pattern is the self-reinforcing cycle of capital accumulation and territorial expansion that Goldstone dismisses as an explanation of the West-East “great divergence,” because in the eighteenth century China also experienced territorial expansion and capital accumulation. It is true that in this period China expanded territorially in Manchuria, Central Asia, and Tibet. However, this expansion pales in comparison with the European takeover of the Americas, North Asia, and much of South and Southeast Asia. One might go further: this expansion may have proved a drain on the Chinese state and almost certainly had little dynamic impact on the Chinese economy in general, capital accumulation or technological advance in particular. Capital accumulation is far trickier to measure than territorial expansion. But even in this sphere, no financial market remotely comparable to Amsterdam or London emerged at this time in China/East Asia.

Quantitative differences notwithstanding, Goldstone is right in emphasizing that what Europeans did with territory and capital mattered more than their mere possession. Indeed, by our own account quantitative differences in rates of territorial expansion and capital accumulation between the two world regions reflected differences in the structure and mode of operation of their interstate systems. In the East Asian system, political, economic, and cultural power was far more concentrated in its center (China) than in the Western European system, where a center proper was much harder to identify both politically and economically. Moreover, although trade within, between, and across political jurisdictions was essential to the operations of both systems, the economic and political importance of long-distance trade (including trade between the two systems) relative to short-distance trade was far greater in the Western European than in the East Asian system. These two differences provide a plausible and simple explanation of why after the middle of the fourteenth century the two world regions developed along increasingly divergent paths. While the Chinese/East Asian path privileged state-making over war-making, and national-economy-making over the formation of overseas commercial and territorial empires, the British/Western European path did just the opposite. From the fourteenth through the eighteenth century, war-making and overseas
empire-building jointly constituted the most prominent form of interstate competition in the European system. They simultaneously promoted territorial expansion and capital accumulation on an unprecedented scale, and continually reproduced the fundamental extroversion of the European system—that is, the dependence of the successful pursuit of power within the system on access to resources (human and non-human) outside the system.

Development along this extroverted path created far better conditions for escaping the high-level equilibrium trap of the Smithian dynamic than development along the introverted East Asian path. The European path had no particular advantage over the East Asian path for product and process innovations originating in activities oriented towards the domestic market. But it had a most conspicuous advantage in the innovations that directly or indirectly originated in one or more of the following three circumstances: the recurrent escalation of the armament race among the European great powers; the intense interstate competition for mobile capital; and the incorporation of a growing proportion of the world’s natural and human resources within the domains of European states. In this interpretation, militarism, capitalism, and territorial expansionism are all essential ingredients of the “magic” formula that enabled the West to escape the Smithian dynamic that over time entrapped the East.

Tribute from India was only a late and particular aspect of this “miraculous” escape. Its significance goes well beyond the £6 million a year on which Goldstone bases the calculations that lead him to dismiss our claim that “the nineteenth-century global UK-centered capitalist system rested from beginning to end on tribute from India.” Indeed, our claim does not refer so much to those £6 million a year as to an earlier and a later contribution. The earlier contribution was the plunder perpetrated by the East India Company at Plassey in 1757. The plunder helped Britain to buy back its national debt from the Dutch and thus start the Napoleonic Wars nearly free from foreign debt. This, in turn, facilitated the six-fold increase in British public expenditure in 1792-1815, to which William McNeill (1982: 211-12) attributes a decisive role in generating the product and process innovations that shaped the capital-goods phase of the industrial revolution.

The later contribution of Indian tribute was both military and financial. Militarily, Indian troops funded entirely by the Indian taxpayer became “the iron fist in the velvet glove of Victorian expansionism...the major coercive force behind the internationalization of industrial capitalism” (Washbrook 1990:481). Financially, India’s balance-of-payments deficits with Britain, and surplus with all other countries, enabled Britain to settle its deficit on current account with the rest of the world. Without its forcible control over India’s balance of payments and monetary reserves, it would have been well-nigh impossible for Britain to continue practicing free trade and keep London the center of the world monetary and financial system (de Cecco 1984: 62-3).

In short, tribute from India and the role it played in shaping and sustaining the nineteenth-century, UK-centered world order took different forms and changed over time. And so did the tribute in natural, human, and monetary resources that Britain and other Western powers extracted from their overseas empires before the nineteenth century. By emphasizing these tributary aspects of the Western developmental path, we do not mean to imply that tribute extraction played the role of main, let alone only, driving force of Western development. We do nonetheless construe overseas tribute extraction as an essential component of the Western developmental path, along with militarism and capitalism. In any event, our main point concerning tribute from India is that the UK-centered world capitalist system relied far more heavily on the actual extraction of tribute for its reproduction than did the allegedly “tributary” China-centered system. Moreover, as Chiu notes in his commentary, an interesting finding of our comparative analysis is that in this respect the post-Second World War US regime in the East Asian region resembled more closely the China-centered tribute-trade system of pre-modern and early modern times than the nineteenth-century UK-centered world capitalist system.
This and other similar findings illustrate one of the central theses of *Resurgence*, namely, the continuing relevance of the historical legacy of the East Asian regional system for an understanding, not just of the present “rise” of East Asia, but also of possible future configurations of the global political economy. Since this is a most controversial thesis, we dedicated a disproportionate amount of our investigation to highlight the features of the East Asian historical legacy that are most relevant in this respect. Chiu’s criticism that this has resulted in an excessive compression of the analysis of contemporary processes and in the absence of explicit theorization is well taken. Hopefully, future investigations will amend these and other shortcomings. Nevertheless, what *Resurgence* has uncovered should caution us against excessive reliance on paradigms and theories shaped predominantly by Western problems and experiences. Thus, I do not think that there is much to be gained by choosing sides—as Chiu invites us to do—between Smith and Marx, Brenner and Wallerstein, and so on. Generally speaking, in the interpretation of historical processes it is more useful to combine different theoretical constructs rather than onesidedly adhere to one of them. Moreover, the solution of new analytical problems—like those involved in comparing the developmental trajectories of two world regions over half millennium, as we attempt in the concluding chapter of *Resurgence*—may require the deployment of theoretical constructs that are difficult to classify in existing typologies (Arrighi 1998; 1999).

This is the case of the theoretical constructs that underlie our story of the divergence and subsequent hybridization of the West European and East Asian developmental trajectories. These constructs are neither Smithian nor Marxian. Although they are influenced by both conceptions of economic development and social change, Weberian, Schumpeterian, Braudelian, and McNeillian influences can also be detected. A rejoinder is not the place to make explicit the epistemological and theoretical foundations of the complex story we tell in *Resurgence*. I do nonetheless have a simple answer to Chiu’s question of whether we found any salient difference in relations of production between East Asia and Europe that could explain the divergence of the two world regions’ developmental trajectories.

The plain answer to this question is that we did not. Differences in relations of production (understood narrowly to exclude transport, storage, and protection) were far greater within each region than between the two regions. Moreover, from a 500-year perspective, salient differences in relations of production between core micro-regions of East Asia and West Europe—such as those discussed in Kenneth Pomeranz’s and Kaoru Sugihara’s chapters—appear to have been more an outcome than a cause of the West-East divergence. In so far as I can see, the only differences that can be construed as an explanation of the divergence are those between the structures and modes of operation of the two world-regional systems as indicated above.

This brings me to Moore’s ecological interpretation of the great divergence. I have no dispute with the contention that the political ecology of wet rice differed radically from that of wheat. Nor do I dispute the contention that the political ecology of wet rice offered the ruling groups of East Asia better opportunities to pursue “internal ecological fixes” than the political ecology of wheat did in Europe. I am even willing to concede that from a temporal perspective longer than our 500-year perspective differences in political ecology might appear as a more important determinant of the subsequent divergence than we have acknowledged.

Granted all this, I remain unconvinced by Moore’s contention that the overseas expansion of Europe was driven by a contraction of seigniorial revenues that could not be resolved through an internal ecological fix. Like Wallerstein’s explanation of the transition from feudalism to capitalism from which it is derived, this contention presents two main problems. First, it provides no factual evidence that feudal lords affected by a contraction of their revenues were the primary agency of the overseas expansion of Europe. Second, and most important, it ignores the leading role that city-states and transnational business diasporas—neither of which was affected by a contraction of seigniorial revenues—actually played in the promotion and
organization of the expansion. Over time, the expansion did provide an “external ecological fix” to the acute social, political, and economic problems of early-modern Europe, as Moore maintains. But unless Moore can demonstrate empirically that such a fix was intended by the promoters and organizers of the expansion, his argument remains as teleological as Wallerstein’s argument that capitalism emerged out of “the desperation of Western Europe’s ruling [strata] during the ‘crisis of feudalism’” (1992: 613, 615; cf. Arrighi 1998).

References


PEWS COUNCIL ELECTION RESULTS:

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PEWS SPONSORED AND CO-SPONSORED SESSIONS AT ASA 2004

The Political Economy of the World System Section is sponsoring four paper sessions and a roundtable session, as well as co-sponsoring a paper session with the Section of Marxist Sociology.

The PEWS section Business Meeting is on Tuesday at 9:30 a.m. and the Section Reception (co-sponsored with several other sections) is on Monday at 6:30 p.m.

In addition, PEWS members have organized and/or are presenting papers in numerous Thematic Sessions and other special sessions throughout the conference. These are too numerous to list here; be sure to look through the conference program for these sessions. PEWS sponsored and co-sponsored activities are listed below in chronological order (first in outline, then with details):

I. OUTLINE OF PEWS SPONSORED ACTIVITIES:

Saturday, 8/14/2004 from 4:30 p.m. - 6:10 p.m.
Paper Session: Marxism and Globalization  
(co-sponsored with the Section on Marxist Sociology)

**Monday, 8/16/2004 from 2:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.**  
PEWS Section Paper Session:  
Changing Intellectual Property Rules and Their Impact on Development

**Monday, 8/16/2004 from 6:30 p.m. - 8:15 p.m.**  

**Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 8:30 a.m. - 9:25 a.m.**  
Roundtables: Section on Political Economy of the World System

**Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 9:30 a.m. - 10:10 a.m.**  
Section Business Meeting: Section on Political Economy of the World System

**Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 10:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.**  
PEWS Paper Session: Globalization of Service Work

**Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 12:30 p.m. - 2:10 p.m.**  
Paper Session: Organized Violence in the Modern World System

**Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 2:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.**  
Invited Panel: Schools of Thought: World Polity and World-Systems

II. DETAILED LISTING OF PEWS ACTIVITIES:

1) **Saturday, 8/14/2004 from 4:30 p.m. - 6:10 p.m.**  
Paper Session: Marxism and Globalization  
(co-sponsored with the Section on Marxist Sociology)

Organizer(s): Ellen I. Rosen (Brandeis University)
Participant(s):
Ellen I. Rosen - Brandeis University (Organizer)
Ellen I. Rosen - Brandeis University (Presider)

Keith Gunnar Bentele (University of Arizona)
Abstract Title: The Temporal Dynamics of Income Inequality in the U.S. States, 1976-1995

Alexander Hicks (Emory University), Linda Beer (Emory University)
Abstract Title: 'Who Benefits from Growth?'

Brian Klocke (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Abstract Title: Narrating Global Preeminence: U.S. Elites and National Discourse of the War on Terrorism
Ellen I. Rosen - Brandeis University (Discussant)

2) **Monday, 8/16/2004 from 2:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.**
**PEWS Session: Changing Intellectual Property Rules and Their Impact on Development**

Organizer(s): Sarah Louise Babb (Boston College)

Participant(s):

Kieran Healy - University of Arizona (Presider)

Shobita Parthasarathy (Northwestern University)
Title: The Patent is Political: Intellectual Property, Biotechnology, and the Implications for European Health Care

Andrew Schrank (Yale University)
Title: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case of Software

Tuba Inci Agartan (SUNY at Binghamton)
Title: WTO and Drug Patents: A Changing Attitude Towards Developing Countries?

Rajeev Patel (Institute for Food and Development Policy), Robert J Torres (St Lawrence University)
Title: 'Poverty justifies intellectual property' - Representations of development and the case for intellectual property in agriculture

Kieran Healy - University of Arizona (Discussant)

3) **Monday, 8/16/2004 from 6:30 p.m. - 8:15 p.m.**
**Joint Section Reception: Collective Behavior and Social Movements, Political**

4) **Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 8:30 a.m. - 9:25 a.m.**
Roundtables: Section on Political Economy of the World System

**Table 1. Networks I**

Matthew Case Mahutga (University of California at Irvine)
Abstract Title: 'Assessing the Extent of Reorganization in the 'New International Division of Labor': A Pilot Network Analysis of International Trade, 1965-2000.'

Christine Petit (University of California, Riverside)
Abstract Title: Social Movement Networks in Internet Discourse

**Table 2. Networks II**

Aaron Z. Pitluck (University of Konstanz)
Abstract Title: Information Games: Foreign Investors & Their Local Broker Networks in an Emerging Market

Jessica Rose Winitzky (University of Utah)
Abstract Title: Interlocking Corporate Directorates: Familial and Informal Ties

Shawn McEntee (Salisbury University)
Abstract Title: Linkages in the World Order Through Inter-Governmental Organizations and Effects on Welfare Provision

**Table 3. Matter, Space, and Transformations**

Michael Stanton Levy (University of Utah)
Abstract Title: Globalization, Biodiversity, and Resistance in Mexico

Stephen Geoffrey Bunker (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Paul S. Ciccarello (Western Michigan University)
Abstract Title: Matter, Space, Time, and Globalization: Iron Ore Mining in the Amazon and Globalization

John Lawrence Gulick (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Abstract Title: The Agrarian Question in Northeast China

Yvonne Alexandra Braun (University of California, Irvine)
Abstract Title: Investigating the Social Impacts of Large Dams

**Table 4. Commodity Chains: Organs, Coffee, Soccer, and Software**

R. Scott Frey (University of North Florida)
Abstract Title: The Organ Market in the World-System
John M. Talbot (Univ. of West Indies)

Abstract Title: Jamaican Blue Mountain Coffee: Quality Standards and Their Impacts on Upgrading in Commodity Chains
Benjamin D. Brewer (Johns Hopkins University)

Abstract Title: The Long Twentieth Century and the Cultural Turn: World-Historical Origins of the Cultural Economy
Aaron M. Katz (Brown University)

Abstract Title: Software Exports and Follower Countries: Little Silicon Valleys?

Table 5. Urban Political Economy
Eric Slater (Manhattanville College)

Abstract Title: Shantytown: Livelihood and World Economy
Kenneth Barr (University of Puget Sound)

Abstract Title: The Built Environment of Polarization

Table 6. Inequality
Richard Tardanico (Florida International University)

Abstract Title: Households, Basic Infrastructure, and Metropolitan Inequality: Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Arthur S. Alderson (Indiana University), Cheol-Sung Lee (Univ of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Francois Nielsen (University of North Carolina)

Abstract Title: Income Inequality, Dependence and the Role of the State
Kristjane Nordmeyer (University of Utah)

Abstract Title: Women’s Education and Economic Development: The Impact of External Debt on Education in Africa

Table 7. Global Governance and Inter-governmental Organizations I
Thomas J. Burns (University of Oklahoma), Jesse Fuchs (University of Oklahoma)

Abstract Title: The International Transport of Hazardous Waste: Some Preliminary Findings from the Basel Convention Data
Jonathan London (University of Wisconsin)

Abstract Title: Globalization, the WTO, and U.S. Hegemony: The Case of Agriculture
Michael John Mulcahy (University of Arizona)

Abstract Title: The Formation of a World Labor Regime: An event history analysis of ratifications of international labor conventions
Table 8. Global Governance and Inter-governmental Organizations II

Sara Schoonmaker (University of Redlands)
Abstract Title: Shifting Strategies of Sovereignty: Brazil and the Politics of Globalization in the WTO and FTAA

Joseph A. Conti (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Abstract Title: State Capacities and Liberalized Markets: The Contradiction of the Interstate System and Global Trade

Table 9. Global Governance and Globalization

Christopher J. Kollmeyer (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Abstract Title: GLOBALIZATION’S EFFECT ON CLASS COMPROMISE IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES

Jeffrey T. Jackson (University of Mississippi)
Abstract Title: Global Governance: Mechanisms of Power and the International Development Profession in Honduras

Marci Lee Gerulis (Northeastern University)
Abstract Title: Globalization: Two Sides of the Debate

Judit Bodnar (Central European University)
Abstract Title: Localization as Risk-Reducing Strategy: Antiglobalizationist Social Movements and Food for Thought

Table 10. World Cities

David A. Smith (University of California-Irvine), Michael Timberlake (University of Utah), Jeffrey D. Kentor (University of Utah)
Abstract Title: Measuring Globalization in the World-System’s City System: A Research Agenda

Jeffrey Lowell Kidder (University of Georgia)
Abstract Title: Capitalism, Congestion, and Couriers: Linking Bicycle Messengers to the World-System

Table 11. Neo-liberal Transitions

Jake Lowinger (Johns Hopkins University)
Abstract Title: African Development ‘Successes’ in Comparative Perspective

Leslie C. Gates (Binghamton University)
Abstract Title: Technocrats and the Private Sector in Mexico’s 1982 Neoliberal Transition

José Gpe. Vargas-Hernández (Centro Universitario del Sur, Universidad de Guadalajara)
Abstract Title: Mexico State’s Economic and Political Transition:

**Table 12. Race, Rights, and Democracy**

Robyn Kimberley Autry (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Abstract Title: Taking Affirmative Action: Race Politics in the United States and South Africa

Kiyoteru Tsutsui (State Univ of NY at Stony Brook), Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton (Oxford University, Nuffield College), John W. Meyer (Stanford University)
Abstract Title: Even Bad States Do Good Things: International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation

Avri Beard (University of California-Berkeley)
Abstract Title: Neoliberalism and Democratization: Why Oligarchs Support Elections

Velina P Petrova (Emory University)
Abstract Title: Determinants of Post-Communist Civil Society: A Quantitative Analysis

**Table 13. Capital, Labor and Production**

Soyon Kim (SUNY- Stony Brook)
Abstract Title: Global Capitalism and the Capital Structure of Chaebols in Korea

Nancy Plankey Videla (Texas A&M University)
Abstract Title: Manufacturing Militance and Consent: Labor Process in a Lean Garment Factory

Cagla Ozgur (Johns Hopkin University)
Abstract Title: Financial Market Liberalization: The Case of Turkey

**Table 14. The longue durée**

Tomas Enrique Encarnacion (Howard University & Project South)
Abstract Title: The Economic and Political Dynamics of the Dominican Republic from 1492 to 1891

Sung-Ho Kang (Sunchon National University)
Abstract Title: Reorient Reappraised: 15-19th East Asia in Korean Perspective

**Table 15. Institutions, Political Reform, and Culture**

Patrick G. Heller (Brown University), Bongani Ngqulinga (Brown University)
Abstract Title: Remaking the Apartheid City: Local Government and Civil Society in South Africa

Paul Gellert (Cornell University)
Abstract Title: Persistent Institutions? On the Political Economy of Timber in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Qian Forrest Zhang (Yale University)
Abstract Title: From Involution to Development: Household Risk Taking and Market Reconstruction in Rural China

Sun-ki Chai (University of Hawaii)

Abstract Title: Culture, Rationality and Economic Institutions in East Asia: The Chinese Family Firm

5) **Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 9:30 a.m. - 10:10 a.m.**
Section Business Meeting: Section on Political Economy of the World System

6) **Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 10:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.**
PEWS Paper Session: Globalization of Service Work

Organizer(s): Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Participant(s):
Joya Misra (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Sabine N. Merz (University of Massachusetts at Amherst), Jonathan Woodring (University of Massachusetts)

Eileen M. Otis (Harvard University)
Abstract Title: Theorizing Gender, Globalization, and Service Work: The Case of China

Winifred R. Poster (Univ of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign)
Abstract Title: Who's On the Line? Indian Call Center Agents Pose as Americans for U.S.-Outsourced Firms

7) **Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 12:30 p.m. - 2:10 p.m.**
Paper Session: Organized Violence in the Modern World System

Organizer(s): Walter Goldfrank (University of California)

Participant(s):
Walter Goldfrank - University of California (Organizer)
Dag MacLeod - Judicial Council of California (Organizer)
Dag MacLeod - Judicial Council of California (Presider)

Joane Nagel (National Science Foundation)
Abstract Title: Masculinities, Femininities, and Fundamentalisms: Gender Confrontations and Collaborations in Political Conflict

Thomas Ehrlich Reifer (University of California-Riverside)
Abstract Title: The Political Economy of Organized Violence and the Analytical Foundations of the World-Systems Perspective: Towards a New Paradigm

Giovanni Arrighi - Johns Hopkins University (Discussant)

8) **Tuesday, 8/17/2004 from 2:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.**
Panel Session: Schools of Thought: World Polity and World-Systems

Participant(s):
Albert J. Bergesen - University of Arizona (Organizer)
Christopher Chase-Dunn - University of California, Riverside (Organizer)
Albert J. Bergesen - University of Arizona (Presider)
Christopher Chase-Dunn - University of California, Riverside (Presider)

John W. Meyer (Stanford University)
Francisco O. Ramirez (Stanford University)
John Boli (Emory University)
David John Frank (University of California, Irvine)

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**PEWS 2005 CALL FOR PAPERS**

*World-Systemic Crisis and Contending Political Scenarios*

The current global condition of widespread violence, enduring economic difficulties for both capital and labor, and a vacuum of hegemony that is expressed in the adventurist war initiatives of the U.S. imperial state, together indicate a secular crisis of the modern world-system. Arguably, such crisis reveals the ultimate limits of the modern world-system and points to the possibility of collective agency toward constructing an entirely different global economic, political, and cultural order of things. Next year's PEWS conference will be dedicated to analyze the political dynamics of the current world-system and to explore the potential for systemic change embedded in its political forms. With this goal in mind, the specificity of the political in the late modern world-system will be discussed in relation to its institutional settings and political fields (inter-state system, state formations, imperialisms), and in terms of its main political battles as well as forms of resistance (struggles and anti-systemic movements). This examination of the politics of the late modern world-system from above and from below will serve as a way of identifying and imagining the possible scenarios for change embodied in the current condition of the world. This theoretical practice of creating goals and conceiving alternative futures on the basis of a careful analysis of the present is what Immanuel Wallerstein had called *Utopistics*. The conference will begin with a plenary giving an overview of the politics of the late modern world-system focusing on questions such as: the articulation of the capitalist world-economy, institutions of global governance, and the inter-state system; the crisis of U.S. hegemony and the drive to empire-building; the crisis of U.S. hegemony and the drive to empire-building; the crisis of U.S. hegemony and the drive to empire-building; the crisis of U.S. hegemony and the drive to empire-building; and how the relative power (in relation to world-
systemic forms of domination) of the subaltern struggles and movements that are emerging as a new wave of antisystemic movements can possibly build a more egalitarian, democratic, and decolonized world-system. The opening plenary will be followed by panel discussions organized around interconnected themes. The conference is open to a variety of papers addressing its main subject, global crisis and the political scenarios of the late modern world-system. Given the main theme we intend to focus on various questions including: the relationship between world-hegemony, global governance, and empire; comparing state formations in different world-regions (Latin America, Africa, Middle East, Europe, East Asia) to get a clear picture of the systemic patterns and local contradictions of the political institutions of the late modern world-system; and analyzing if there exists a new wave of antisystemic movements and what are their potential and possibilities for systemic change. The conference will close with another plenary session in which the question of the politics of the late modern world-system and the possible scenarios for systemic change will be discuss in light of the dialogue that occurred. The conference will take place April 28-30, 2005 at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Send your proposals to Agustin Lao-Montes and/or Joya Misra to: lao@soc.umass.edu; misra@soc.umass.edu; or Sociology Department, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003. The deadline to submit abstracts is December 15, 2004.

MEMBER NEWS AND PUBLICATION ANNOUNCEMENTS

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My paper (Can Democracy End Political Violence in the Middle East?) has been accepted for presentation before the XVI meeting of the International Society for Research on Aggression, to be held at Santorini Island, Greece, Sept. 18-22, 2004.

Abstract

Recently, there have been strong hints to the lack of democracy in the Middle East. The United States is calling for the democratization of Middle Eastern societies. President Bush and Secretary of State, Colin Powell, spoke about the issue several times. Although there isn’t until now a fully developed scheme of how to democratize the area, it seems that the American administration is taking the matter seriously.

This paper aims at testing the relationship between democracy and political violence in the Middle East. The study asks whether the absence of democratic regimes is the main cause of political violence, and whether the presence of such regimes can secure peace and end or at least reduce political violence in a region that has been torn by wars and conflicts for many decades.

To discuss the subject from a broad perspective, the study raises the following questions:
1- Why does the Middle East lack democracy in the first place?
2- Is it possible to democratize the Middle East?
3- Should democracy come from below, from above, or from outside?
4- What type of democracy suits the Middle Eastern countries?
5- Can democracy end political violence in the Middle East?

To help answer these questions, the study gathers opinions of experts on the Middle East, including political activists, political scientists, journalists, and intellectuals.

Key words: democracy, political violence, peace, the state, the Middle East.


Contributors: Ethel Brooks, Pauline Cullen, Bob Edwards, Daniel Faber, John W. Foster, Arunas Juska, Laura MacDonald, Gay Seidman, Peter Waterman, Lesley Wood.

Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in Mexico
By Dag MacLeod
4/14/2004 | 296 pgs | 6 x 9
Comparative Politics
Hardback: $65.00 short | 0-271-02365-1

Beginning in 1983, the Mexican government implemented one of the most extensive programs of market-oriented reform in the developing world. Downsizing the State examines a key element of this reform program: the privatization of public firms.
After providing a broad overview of the growth and decline of public ownership in Mexico, Dag MacLeod analyzes the process of privatization in three key industries—aviation, telecommunications, and railroads. Drawing upon interviews with government officials, business executives, and labor leaders as well data from government archives and corporate documents, MacLeod highlights the difficulties of linking market reforms to improved public welfare. Privatization failed to live up to its promise of raising living standards or decentralizing the economy. Indeed, privatization actually increased the concentration of wealth in Mexico while redirecting the economy toward foreign markets.

These findings contribute to theoretical debates regarding state autonomy and the embeddedness of economic action. MacLeod calls into question the autonomy of the Mexican state in its privatization program. And, while accepting the basic premises of economic sociology, he shows that the creation of markets where public firms once dominated has involved both the destruction of social relations and the construction of new relations and institutions to regulate the market.

Downsizing the State is a theoretically innovative account of how actors and institutions may construct capitalist markets so that they actually resemble the asocial ideal of neoclassical economics: facilitating exchange among actors while denying the obligations and commitments that attach to other types of social relations.

Dag MacLeod is Senior Research Analyst with the Judicial Council of California.

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CALLS FOR PAPERS

Scott A. Hunt is the editor-elect for the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography. JCE publishes theoretically, methodologically, and substantively significant studies based upon participant-observation, unobtrusive observation, intensive interviewing, and contextualized analysis of discourse as well as examinations of ethnographic methods. Submissions from all substantive areas and theoretical perspectives are welcomed. Email manuscript
submissions (in Word or WordPerfect format) may be sent to sahunt00@uky.edu. Hardcopy submissions and all other correspondence should be sent to Scott A. Hunt, Editor, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Department of Sociology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0027. A processing fee of US$10 must be submitted via a check or money order made payable to the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography.

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JOB ANNOUNCEMENTS

The University at Albany, SUNY. The Department of Sociology at the University at Albany invites applications for a tenure track position (contingent on final budgetary approval) to begin Fall 2005 at the rank of Assistant Professor, with competitive salary, from candidates whose primary area of specialization is comparative/globalization. Candidates who use either quantitative or qualitative methods are encouraged to apply. Experience and interest in teaching Intro to Sociology will be viewed as an asset. We seek candidates who demonstrate the potential for excellence in research, who exhibit a strong commitment to teaching and service, and who have demonstrated ability to work with and instruct culturally diverse groups of people. PhD preferred, ABD within one year of completion will be considered. Applicants should send a letter of interest, curriculum vitae, and three letters of reference; finalists will be asked to provide additional materials related to research and teaching. Applications will be screened beginning October 15. The University at Albany is an EO/AA/IRCA/ADA employer. All materials should be addressed to: Russell Ward, Chair, Department of Sociology, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, New York 12222.

University of Arizona. The Department of Sociology invites applications for tenure-track or tenured faculty positions, to begin Fall, 2005, contingent upon availability of funding. We welcome applicants in all areas of specialization, though for one of these positions we are particularly interested in candidates who specialize in the study of social institutions or inequality, including race, ethnic, and gender inequality. We also are interested in candidates who will contribute to graduate training in either quantitative or qualitative methods. The Department is seeking an individual who is able to work with diverse students and colleagues, and who has experience with a variety of teaching methods and curricular perspectives. Review of applications will begin September 15, 2004 and will continue until the positions are filled. An on-line application, including a letter of interest and vita, must be completed at www.uacareertrack.com/applicants/Central?quickFind=176954. Applicants also should send a vita, letter of interest, samples of written work, and three letters of recommendation to Professor Ronald Breiger, Chair of Faculty Search Committee, Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, PO Box 210027, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027. The University of Arizona is an EEO/AA EmployerM/W/D/V.

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EDITOR’S NOTE
I would like to thank Ho-fung Hung, the guest editor of our symposium, and all of our contributors for presenting a thought-provoking discussion of one of the most important issues in the world-system today. I would also like to thank all of our numerous other contributors to this issue; these contributions are what make the newsletter useful to our section members. Please continue to send contributions to me at paul.ciccantell@wmich.edu.

Please take special note of the listings of Section activities at the ASA Meetings in this issue. I’m looking forward to seeing all of you in San Francisco at the ASA Meetings in a couple of weeks!

Paul